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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7g. 
WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT TAUGHT? 
Part Il 
James Audley McLaughlin* 
In a dusty corner of my attic I recently discovered on an old·• 
yellowed manuscript, which was printed in rather new letters, a 
little parable that seems relevant to an understanding of the role ' 
~ of the Supreme Court in our democracy and, moreover, seems ..t 
fitting starting point for a discussion of, and a search for, a legitimate; 
role for the Court, i.e. one that is compatible with democracy, 
This discussion and search include criticism of the role the Court 
has actually played in the recent past and the "faulty teaching" tha~ ·: 
has resulted, all of which will bring us back to Lance v. Board of 
Education of Roane County," discussed in Part I. 
-AParable-
Adam is a man of indeterminate age. He has been sitting in his 
study, in sober and reflective contemplation as to how he will litit{/ 
his life. His old servant, Samuel, has just entered. 
Adam: Samuel, my good and faithful servant, I have jii.sl · 
written a resolution as to how I shall live my Zif e. It is a list of pre:,;\ 
cepts, worked out through reason, here in the quiet of my study, a.f 
though, Lord knows, with much fevered debate with myself. t: 
think, if I keep to them, they give me the best rusurance I coul/1 
want of a long and happy life. (Hands Samuel the Resolution.) 
Samuel: I see, yes, well very commendable. 
Adam: Now these precepts, by which I hope to govern mj\ 
future conduct, are a list of things I cannot do. Of course being' 
a reasonable and experienced man, I know that under stress an{!': 
momentary passion, such resolutions are often broken even by th{ 
most resolute of men. But I'm most determined to avoid such lapst~ 
and that's why I've called you in. I have made you a sort of guarditir{ 
of my Resolution. In fact I have provided for it as part of the Reso!~~ 
lion, itself. You know I think of you as my wisest old servant. You're.' 
very learned in the law, which I have a particularly great respec( 
"'Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.i\. , 
1962, Ohio State University; J.D., 1965, Ohio State Univ rsity. . . , 
1 170 S.E.2d 783 (W,Va. 1969) cert. granted sub nom. Gordon v. France, 3S.,; 
U.S.LW. 3388 (U.S. April 6, 1970) (No. 1244). .. 
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} '. for, and you have often been my advisor and even, as you know, my 
·· inspiration. 
· Samuel: (mildly puzzled) That's very flattering but what 
· does this Guardianship entail? · 
Adam: Well you know by long habit and custom I frequently 
tum to you to effect many of my actions. 
Samuel: Yes, go on. 
Adam: In the future you are to refuse such cooperation when 
in your opinion you feel my action violates my Resolution. You 
are absolutely to refuse such cooperation for thirty days and if at 
the end of that time I have not reformed or amended my Resolu-
tion, you should persist in refusing cooperation. All that I have 
written into my Resolution. 
Samuel: I see, and I suppose you want me to write out my 
reasons for refusing cooperation, as has always been my custom in 
' other matters. 
Adam: Exactly., that "writing out" your reasons is one of the 
chief reasons y01lre so respected. You see, a lot of the language in 
my Resolution I learned from you, and_I'll be frank and admit I 
!,,ave a less sophisticated understanding of its meaning, implications 
· . . and ramifications than you, my great teacher. 
Samuel: (smiling patronizingly) Yes, I suppose. 
Adam: The thirty days will allow me time to return to the 
quiet of my study, to reevaluate my Resolution calmly and dis-
passionately in the light of my own experience and what you have 
taught me. I can take stock of my life and how I want to live it, If 
I have reformed or amended my Resolution, then- you must be 
guided by such changed Resolution, and determine its meaning for 
future cooperation. 
Samuel: But if you haven't amended it I'm to persist in my 
refusal. 
Adam: (now seeming to note the patronizing smile) You do 
realize,_ of course, that they are my resolutions - even though learned 
from yo·u. (rather emphatically) A n-d if I should persist, despite your 
teaching, in a course of conduct you say is proscribed by my Resolu-
tion I should expect you, being wise as well as learned and good 
(Adam gives Samuel an imploring but vaguely threatening look) , to 
reexamine your own interpretation in light of my contrary one as 
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Samue1: (musing) Hmmm. S 
Adam: But I do want you to be objective and disintere#¢iitJ· 
in ?our judgment. ~n fact, as part of ~he Reso~ution itself, I've• '4p~· 
pointed you Guardian of my Resolution for life and with pay t,,ot 
to be diminished. . ); 
Samuel: But Adam, my boy, what power will I have tor¢~) 
cooperation or to keep you to your past practice as to the nee,i Joi' 
my cooperation? In short, how can I keep you to your Resolu,.ti¢ri) 
when you have never given me a gun or made me privy to y,q,h/ 
bank account? . ·; J 
Adam: I've no intent of making you my master, Samuel; bui 
only to retain you as my servant - with a special, perhaps ~~i 
exalted, role. ·.·.·.·' 
Samuel: (still perplexed) Ah, but what a puny guardian. ,t.oJ_ 
make of me; most of the real Resolution-keeping depends an ;i~u'. 
How can I save you from yourself? 
Adam: You can't. But you think me a reasonable man, dti"'r/ 
you, Samuel? I mean generally and usu.ally. You often told m_d; s 
in the past - that's why I decided I cou.ld be master. (now q,4i~tI 
cajoling, perhaps afraid he will lose his esteemed servant) flu 
you've always been my most trusted teacher and now even mot.~: sq 
Why, you can teach me what I meant by some of my precepts/f.1/ 
used words that you have taught me. Certainly you'll knottrl' 
what they mean in some future situation. Why, I've learne4 l(ij 
that words sometimes change meaning over time. And the ide'l4j t 
goals, th.at my precepts embody! I learned them from you--. ri;t 9. 
least a good many of them. I mean these precepts to last a lifeJipif 
They're fairly general - only guides - some general "can't d~'si 
And I don't claim my reason to be perfect - even in the qui.~t o 
my study. Perhaps you'll think it best to ignore some - I'll tfu.i. 
you in this - but please make me understand why. Maybe....- (~~ 
then Adam reflects for a moment) why maybe somtime you'ti; te{ 
me - that a "cannot do" is a "must do". I suppose it is pP$sfb 
though I can't conceive of it - considering you only 1coop¢ta 
with my doing. And you are my servant. · ' . · \ 
Samuel: (his face has been slowly brightening and now lj.11:s ••.•• 
confident glow) Why certainly. Sometimes when you do $q11i 
thing - I'll say, "But if you want my cooperation - you'll haf!f . 
do it such and such a way consistent with your Resolution.'" 14~. 
that's a sort of "must do". · ···· 
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Adam: See, you're teaching me already. You know, Samuel, 
your cleverness and ingenuity sometimes frighten me. I'm glad you 
are too weak to lift a gun and a total loss with money. In any event 
you're certainly not clever or strong enough to get either guns or 
money. In that regard you're certainly the least dangerous of my 
servants. 
Samuel: But I can protect you from those overweening other 
servants and agents of yours. 
Adam: Nonesense, Samuel, I'll protect you from them if 
there's any protecting to be done, and don't you forget it. (Raising 
his eyebrows wryly) That is, as long as I want to; (warming more to 
the taunt) as long as you make me want to - wise old friend. 
Samuel: (muttering half-aloud) Some Resolution. A bunch of 
"cannot do's." How can I keep him good and make him great? Thrry 
should be. plain "do's" and "don'ts." "Cannot do's" without "must 
do's'' is feckless and fatuous. 
Adam: Stop that muttering, old man. The idea of "must do's'' 
is fevering your brain. The idea of what I shall do I purposely left 
to day-to-day consideration. Maybe s.ome day I'll sit down and 
think it all through again and put it in some "must do's". And I'll de-
cide when and where. And I'll get a better guardian for "do's' than 
you, my poor, weak old fellow. Do you understand'! 
· Samuel: (Getting up - somewhat -crest-fallen, preparing to 
leave - muttering to himself) This poor Adam - always was slow -
doesn't understand about "drls" and "don'ts'. How can J ever make 
him great'! 
Adam: Great'! Just keep me good, Samuel, I'll become great 
on my own. You can teach me a little about greatness but that's 
all. Hold me to my Resolutions as best you can - others will help 
me to greatness. Having your hoary old head shake "no" and your 
'weathered old finger point me to the quiet of my study from time 
to time - that's all I ask of you. If I go crazy it'll be on my own. If 
I become completely lost to reason, you are much too puny to save 
me. I'll throw you and all resolutions out. 
Samuel: And if you are not - you have no real need of me. 
Adam: No. No. I love and venerate you, my dear, learned old 
hand. You've long been my teacher and guide. You were once my 
i, friend and interceder. You, more than anyone, raised me to be 
· master. That I won't let you undo. But I want you to continue as 
my teacher, my trusted servant, and now as Guardian against my 
4
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momentary lapse from reason. Respect my Resolution; remind rrt.&: 
of it; teach me more about it; gi:ve me time to reflect. And that's azi,. 
you can do. ···' 
Samuel: Well I guess that's a good deal. That should tax eve~·_ 
my resources. 
Adam: Ah, my most civilized servant, you're beginning to s~·: 
the subtlety of your position. 
Samuel: Yes, I guess. 
Adam: (looking at him with great veneration) Ah, Samur:l?' 
you wise, learned, good . . . puny old man. 
This little tale leaves off where the dialogue really just begin.s~t) 
It sounds, I confess, much like Professor Alexander :Sickel's explaw, · 
ation' with one exception. Professor Bickel does not believe Adam:'' 
called Samuel in and had their little talk.' Samuel was simply thei:~r;\ 
learned his role from practice, and Adam from long deference t~I: 
Samuel's judgement, learned not only to live with him as "guardiari~' . 
servant but to like it - and about on the terms the dialogue sugi · . 
gests." The difference between "willing" the guardian role, aq:~ <(' 
passive, but "liking", acceptance, may, on cursory observation, a:~· '/) 
pear to make little difference in determining the role Samuel (a_f \ 
legitimately play in Adam's life. However, as will be pointed ocit /' 
below, the distinction may run deeper and may rest in part op-.~: > 
different concept of man or the law. But it may rest, I must p¢ • .... 
quick to add, on nothing more substantial than semantics. ·· ·· ./ 
Students of the history of judicial review might also find i_t pa*s.J, . / 
ing strange that Adam's other servants (called "servants and agenl$.?'.' 
for· some reason) were not more prominently mentioned, for ~~ 
important aspect of judicial review in its role in the interrelatfoftt-
ship between the three branches of government. In fac_t, fonneti~t 
this was thought to be the only role of judicial review. The vie1 .. 
once. universally obtained that judicial review was a neces~~ 
• For example the very difficult problem of defining the areas of cooperatj'p~ 
between Adam and Samuel. Who shall determine its limits: Adam in the restibi-
tion? Adam by usage after the resolution? Adam by separate grant 0tr definiµ~~ 
after the resolution? Or all three? Samuel by interpreting the resolution? A:i(cl: 
so forth. , ,, 
Another obviQus additional problem is the relationship between Sariiji# 
and Adam's other servants or agents-alluded to only briefly in the dialogµ,~. 
(See note 10 infra). · ·) 
"A. IlICKFL, THE 1.EAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
• 1d. at 21. 
• Id. especially at 23-28. 
...... , .. ,~~-·-····· 
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method of protecting the people, both individually and collectively, 
from the government they had set over themselves.• The protection 
was afforded by enforcing the limitations contained in the basic 
charter or social compact - limitations aimed primarily at the 
lawmaker and law enforcer. 
The premise of the former view was that we are governed b)' 
our elected officials. The view of Professor Bickel; which is typically 
modern: is that we are governed through our elected officials.• 
That is why Bickel sees the limitations imposed on government 
through judicial review as undemocratic.• They are limitations on 
the people acting collectively, i.e. on democracy. Bickel can dis-
miss Hamilton's explanation of the democratic basis of judicial 
review bec'ause it was based on the premise of the former view -
that we are governed by our elected officials." Ultimately it is that 
premise that Bickel is rejecting. Hamilton, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, and others with Hamilton's assumption would either not 
• See nm FJIDERAUST No. 78. (A. Hamiltqn) . It is, of course, a view still held 
by many. See, e.g., ROlltow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NontE 
DAMI> LAWYER 573 (1958) • 
• Perhaps this view is foreshadowed by James Madison, For example take 
the following passage in a letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 17, 1788: 
What use then it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in pDpular 
Governments? . . . I. The political truths declared in that solemn 
manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free 
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national senti-
ment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion. 2. Altho it be 
generally true . . . that the danger of oppression lies in the interested 
majorities of the people rather than in the usurped acts of the Govern-
ment, yet there may be occasions on which the evil may- spring from 
the later source; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for 
an appeal to the sense of the community .. ·. . 5 Writings of Jam,es 
Madison, 269, 271-74 (Hunt ed. 1904) (as ci.ted in Barrett, Bruton, and 
Honnold, Constitutiotnal Law 590 (3d ed. 1968)) . 
But note that Madison saw the :SUI of Rights as being really effective only 
against governmental exce~s and not popular ones. Thus he basically differs 
from Bickel and the Parable. 
"A. BIGKF.L supra· note 3, at 16-17. 
0 Id. at 18. 
""I make this inference from Bickel's stat.ement at 17 that when the Supreme 
Oourt exercises its power of judicial review "it thwarts the will of representatives 
of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control not on behalf of the 
prevailing majority, but against it." This seems to show that Bickel has assumed 
at le:i5t a rough identity between legislative will and popular will, whereas 
Ha~1lton's .whole premise (which Bickel bad juxtaposed) was on their con-
tranet~. It is on such identity that the "one man, one vote" rule in legislative 
apportionment is predicated. Such rule is itself a manifestation of this evolu-
tion from the Hamiltonian assumption (more compatible with the pure trustee 
theory of representation) to the B-ickel assumption (compatible only with the 
fure del~te or reflector theory of representation) . See Part I of thi.s article, 
,2 W. VA. L REv. at 23-32. 
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understand the "Adam-Samuel" dialogue or think it grossly IllI:$;-
conceived.'1 It was based on the Bickel premise. However, there: 
was some ambiguity in the parable about "other servants an& 
agents." I would guess that the parable writer had some ambi~: 
valence about the premises himself. -
As will be· pointed out below, there still is vitality to one as/ 
pect of the Hamiltonian Premise that we choose not law in election~· .. : 
·J, 
but lawmakers and law enforcers, i.e. that we are governed by, (n.o;k) 
through}, our elected officials. This still vital aspect is the idea ol; 
political leadership, an idea which is still premised in part ~ti/ 
Platonic notions of aristocracy. As I hope to show, it adds weight 
and color to the assertion that judicial review is democratic, sin4"e . 
it demonstrates- that judicial review is only different in degree, n;~t\s' 
kind, from other democratic decision-making. . · 
But the parable suggests another answer to the charge thai 
judicial review is essentially undemocratic. It assumes the Bkk:et~ 
premise but nonetheless baldly asserts - if the metaphor is to b{' 
taken literally - that the people would choose (are choosing in mi 
quiet of their study) the institution of judicial review. That aµi~ . 
wer is that we, the people, and as a People, have two wills: the J;jf,., ·· 
to the immediate practical solution to a pressing problem or f1i:k ·. 
attainment of an immediately desired end, and the will to live dfo 
good life and to become the great society."' .-:;'; · .. 
u With the Hamiltonian premise the dialogue would go somthing ~{ 
this: 
Adam: Samuel, since I trust your judgeme,it in reading and apply· 
ing plain words and since you lack force or will on your own and th'U$ 
are yourself no threat to me, I am entrusting into your keeping this. 
compact with all my servant!!' which specifically sets forth their powers 
and limitations in acting on my behalf. Ariytime they need your cooperas 
tion in taking care of me, refuse it unless in your opinion their action 
is authorized and ne>t prohibited by the compact. And to assure· your 
independent judgemernt in this I appoint you fOT life, etc. ·. 
Samuel: And shall I determine the occasions in which coopero,-
tion is necessary. . 
Adam: No, I've specified those. In general, the occasions for y ur 
cooperation are those of custom and past mage. Of course, (with a 
wry smile) custom and usage o:re vague enough terms to require some 
judgmtmt in interpretation. I'll leave that to the three of you to work out. 
Samuel: Well traditional cooperation leaves se>me wide areas in 
U!hich the others can. run amuck. 
Adam: I know, but I picked my servants tmd I can unpick them 
toe>. That's enough control for many purposes. In any event it will haue to 
do. The alternative would require a complete change in your personality. 
And 
then 
you would be no good for anything. [and so forth]. ... ·'.\ 
""A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 24, talks of this same bifurcation but calls; It ·. 
the "two aspects" of "actions of government." But he apparently does not fc,~f . 
that the second aspect (the long-run, "'good society" aspect) can be thou@t';: 
of as "popular wilL" · 
7
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Two more general caveats on translating the parable too 
literally: 
Adam appears to personify a monolithic popular will. The 
assertion that there is a monolithic popular will is, of course, a 
gross oversimplification. But to the extent that popular will is 
translated through popular elections into positive law, it is mono-
lithic. The law has one voice. It is Adam's act. The single nature of 
Adam. Moreover, since Adam's precepts are all "thou shall nots" he 
appears to be the embodiment of popular will as manifest through 
both federal and state politics. But the problems of federalism need 
not detain us here; they are of a different genus, and would only 
cloud the effort of the parable writer to set forth through metaphor 
the justification for judicial review in a democracy. 
I will now turn to the effort of fleshing out the ideas adum-
brated in the parable - a:; a friendly critic of mine says, "to make a 
short story long" - to cite specific examples of the present Court's 
deviation from its "legitimate role"; the effects, of such deviation 
and; some propdsals for change. 
THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
I. 
THE BASIS OF ] UDICIAL REVIEW AS A 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION. 
The technical basis of the Supreme Court's power of judicial 
review has been much mooted.'" It needs no further elaboration here. 
The opinions or theories have run from those like that of Pro-
fessor Wechslerl< which find express authority for judicial review 
in the Constitution (Article Ill and Article VI, § 2) to those like 
that of the late Judge Learned Hand which find the power implied 
but only "to prevent the defeat of the venture at hand."'" Suffice it to 
say that long usage and general acceptance have sanctioned the 
power and have made it a hallowed institution in our American 
form of government. 
JJI See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DtJKE L.J. 
l, 45. for an excellent "Pairtial Bibliogcaphy" of the literature on judicial 
review. For example see Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept 
of Administrative Constitutional Law, 69 W.VA. L. REv. Ill, 249 (1967). 
'"Wechsler, Tcrward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 llillv. L. 
REv. l, 2"10 (1959) • 
"'L. HAND, Tm B1u. OF Rma-rs 14 (1958). 
8
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But the little parable was not merely a way of expressing wh~ 
might have happened but was really aimed at beginning the ¢ffor 
to "justify [judicial review] as a choice in our own time.'"" Ai:la 
is man today as well as man yesterday. The parable writer doe~,\ 
conclude, with Bickel, that judicial review is a "deviant institut;ip~ 
which, "if the process is properly carried out," may re$iilt J1 > 
"tolerable accommodation with the theory and practice of .d¢rn·. 
cracy-"" Rather he contends that it is an institution which, w)/ 
properly carried out, fully accords with the theory and pratdi:ii •····· 
democracy in America - without in the least depreciating ¢tth 
"the central function" of the electoral process in such tb,eoty: ~···· 
practice or "the policy-making power of representative in}titt:ifi!i 
born of the electoral process, [ as J the distinguishing ch!!,tat:t.¢.1;!\1 
of the system.",. Put in starkest terms, I contend that we, th~::'.p/ 
sent people, would, through the electoral process, overwheJmfhgl 
endorse judicial review when judicial review is properly ti!r.tii;~f.otj 
The only condition would be that the election must be held Jri tii 
"quiet of our study." Of course no such election has been. o.tWijI '' 
held. No empiricial proof of the assertion can be offerecl/~ Jt{f.f 
yourself this: Is not the idea of the Supreme Court's {urti::d,n. 
woven into the fabric of our democracy, and into the pat~tn·. 
expectations of the people and how we view ourselves :'!.$ .~ ii;~tic? 
that the outcome would be obvious? But aside from tb,e b~d· 
sertion that judicial review would be endorsed by a natiort,4J·e 
endum, our democracy, as it has evolved, has. three gen1ctral atttf~ut 
which make most plausible the assertion that judicial tev:iej is/ 
democratic instituton, albeit one of a special nature, Tues¢ aj/'e th 
dUll[ nature of the "will of the people," the leadership Qt •fjrif 
cratic" element that inheres in democratic decision mc1kirtg lt •·••··•· 
levels, and the general nature of democratic leadershi'.p as. Mb,,t:h{ 
through public dialogue. What has been referred to as w.e· d.~~1 .. ·· 
ture of "willing," i.e. the "will" to the present act and th¢ ."·,..,r 
to keep one's resolution, was the special. point of the p~ra~J#.~ ":I;.,:c 
other two attributes remain to be discussed. · ·· 
1• A. BrCKE.L, supra note 3, at 16. 
''Id. at 28. 
'"Id. at 19. . 
10 It might be some proof, however, that despite the hue and cry ~Yo/ .th 
deviant practice manifested by the Dred Scott Case (Dred S~a(t v, Sarfl,gf(d, • , .. 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)) and by the early New Deal Cc/,l;lrt 3,II~·. }?<Y t~ .• 
Warren Court, there arose no politically viable movement to enc:! oi; evi::q weal~5. 
the Court. · · · .. 
9
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The Aristocratic Element in Democratic Government 
''A bevy of Platonic Guardian"00 the people probably do not 
want without it being clear that they are "guardian-servants." But 
there is a strong element of the aristocratic (in the Platonic sense} 21 
running throughout our democratic institutions both in the political 
l>ranch and in the courts. I do not mean aristrocratic in the sense of 
a "power elite"22 or an autonomous Establishment or anything like 
an aristocracy of the ancien regime. Such aristocracies are not com-
patible with democracy. Rather I mean aristocratic in the sense of 
trusting a large part of government, including leadership in basic 
policy, to a responsible, constantly changing, amorphous group of 
the most competent public officials that can be found."' Of course it 
it is the general public's understanding of competency that is the 
criterion, and such understanding may be viewed as wanting by 
rp:;my individuals in the public. But the point is that the people 
choose, by their own best lights, those who they think are best 
qualified to lead, not those who they think are most like themselves. 
Though "the heart of the democr~tic faith is government by the 
consent of the governed,".. and this consent is manifest through 
t:he electoral process, the people_ nonetheless choose to be governed 
by 
the officials 
elected as well as to govern through them. 
The premise is that a representative democracy is more than a 
mere expediency. It is also a deliberate choice of leaders based on 
the aristocratic principle defined above. People choose a repre-
sentative not only because he reflects their own views on the pro-
bable issues to be decided but also because they trust his judgment 
to decide issues for them - issues they either do not know of or do 
not feel competent to judge. They no doubt trust his judgment part-
ly because he reflects their general attitudes and interests and they 
.. L HAND, supra, note 15, at 73. 
" See Tm; REPUBLIC. 
.. C. WRIGHT Mru:.s, THE POWER ELITE (1956). 
""See -N. THOMAS and K. LAMB, CoNGRESS, POl'.ITICS AND PRACl'ICE (1965). 
'lj',dwards, The Theoretical o;nd Comparative Aspects of Reapportionment and 
R!;districting with Reference to Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L R.F.v. 1265, 1272-73 
(1962) cites "empirical studies on both sides of the Atlantic." He concludes, 
· . . that there may be few positive correlations between the action of 
the representative and the combined will of his distTict - or at least less 
positive correlation than generally supposed. This is bet":ause of alleged 
~uperior qualities of the house member, bis relative freedom to exercise 
mdependent judgment, and also the conditioning process of group 
dynamics in legislative bodies directed by institutionalized elites, not to 
mentfon the restraining impact of other chambers and branches. 
.. A. Bickel, supra note 3, at 27. 
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want his expert application of their attitudes and their interests to 
issues as they arise. But more than that, they want his expert 
definition of their own attitudes and interests. Madison spoke of the 
capacity of representative government "to refine and enlarge the 
public vieWs, by passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the tnie interest 
of their country.""' 
As a corollary to this, the people want their public officials to 
carry on a dialogue with them as to what is in their interest and 
what their attitude should be."' In other words, teaching is done 
by all branches of government-political as well as judicial. As 
Mr. Justice Brandeis so eloquently stated in Olmstead v. United 
States,"' governm_ent is '-'the potent, the omnipresent teacher." The 
point here, however, is that the political branches of government 
also teach by means other than their example. They teach, like the 
school master, through lecture and reasoned dialogue. And more 
importantly (both to the nation and to the point being made 
here) this dialogue concerns not only the course to be taken to 
solve pressing needs, but additionally includes the basic ideals and 
goals of the nation - what we are and where we are going as 
people. 
For ex.ample, the American people probably would not by 
referendum approve of certain civil rights iegislation such ~ 
open housing ... Nonetheless, Congress and many states have passed 
such legislation. On the other hand. the American people, the 
great present demos, would probably overwhelmingly 'approve of 
the ideal that open housing legislation is thought by its proponents 
.. Edwards, supra note 23 citing C. REARi>, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST 7!f . 
(1948\. . , 
,,.,This hypothesis will have t.o be tested in the laboratory of your own. 
experlence. Two suggestions: (I) Do not let your feeling of general popular· 
apathy and ignorance on political issues color your judgment as to whether 
or not people generally want at least some information and inspinttion froJD. 
their political leaders even at the local level, and also keep in mind that people 
generally, even the so-called Silent Majority, give feed-hack to which they want · 
response. (2) The higher the political office the greater is the desire for 
inspirational as opposed to informational interchan~. Various political science 
studies show that the pro~ of opinion making and decision making is too 
complex and variegated to be amenable to any but the grossest of measure-
ments. See, e.g., Dexter, The Representative and his District, reprinted in New 
Perseptives on the HO'USe a-f Represe,uatives 3, (1963).; R. DAHL, WHO GoVERNS.' 
DEMOCRACY AND POWER lN AN AMERICAN CrlY (1961). 
z 277 U.S. 438, 435 (1928). . 
""See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (196'7); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 
U.S. 385 (1969). 
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to help actualize. Moreover, one ventures to guess that most of the 
people would acknowledge that they have no precise understanding 
of what "equal protection," "due process" or "badges and incidents 
of slavery" mean, except in terms of equally vague ideals slich as 
fairness or justice. Moreover, they would be quite diffident about 
applying such ideals to particular situations. Most people would 
say: "That's for courts and legislators to decide - they are trained 
for it and devote all their time to it"- in short, that's their job. 
But their job is yet more, for the people want and need a sense of 
participation in the precise application of the ideal to concrete 
situations. They want to know what an deal held with abiding 
conviction - but vague sense - means in this or that situation. The 
conviction is probably symbolized by a phrase (e.g., "equal pro-
tection of law," "freedom of speech," "a man's home is his castle") 
or ritual (e.g., singing ''America" or saluting the flag). But, no 
matter how vaguely understood, or how mute and inarticulate, it 
is the conviction of a truth which thrills, a physically felt, emotional 
thing. And they want to participate by being told in such a fashion, 
with such articulation, that they may see the "ideal which thrills" 
come to life and be thrilled anew. And this articulation should be 
no pandering to the irrational. That the People are basically rational 
is the faith of democracy. It is the faith of Brandeis concurring in 
Whitney v. California"" - "Believing in the power of reason as ap-
plied through public discussion .... """ Rather this articulation is a 
process of education, and " [ e] ducation is a 'drawing out' and its 
business is not merely to confirm a man in what he already knows 
and to exalt his own immediate preferences and predilections."31 
And what of the "thrill" from this education in ideals? Professor 
Harry Kalven, Jr., in a footnote concluding an article on New 
York Times v. Sullivan"' quotes Professor Alexander Meiklejohn of 
Harvard who, when asked what he thought of the new articulation 
and definition of Freedom of Expression in New York Times, 
said: "It is an occasion for dancing in the streets." .. There is the 
thrill from participation in the rearticulation of an abiding ideal -
the feeling that is "an occasion for dancing in the streets." 
"'274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
30 Jd. at 375 . 
., How ARD F. Lowlty COLLEGE TALKS 115 a. Blackwood ed. 1969) . 
""376 U.S. 254 (1964) . 
"'Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on ''The Central Meaning 
of the First Amendment," 1964 SUl'lt:EME CoUR.T REvraw 191, 221 n.125. 
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There are two sorts of "basic ideals" which "thrill" when. fteyh, e:' 
Iy articulated and exemplified. First, there is the ideal image of:.t>,ti/f 
present selves: the image of what we ought now to be - the Q;;ttio'ttafi: 
conscience; that nation in the "quiet of its study." It is analpgo4ii~>\ 
an individual's resolution to live a good and moral life. Second} 
there is the ideal image of the nation we want to become, wh~-tJi;n 
want to progress to - our own vision of the great and happy :nat:i~k} 
It is analogous to an individual's ambition to be great pr rfoh:, ~f 
famous. Both ideals are elusive, overlapping, a mixture of half-tori~, 
scious abstraction and vague but profound emotion. ·,t · ···· 
To recapitulate - from the above discussion the foliPw.Jpgi 
three premises emerge. First the people have two often coni;t;,i:di~tih<: 
wills; (a) the will to the immediate end and (b) the will tiJ, ~je,' 
ideal (also twofold) . Second, choosing men as "leaders" a,s Welf;k;} 
"reflectors" is of the essence of our democracy. Third, leadtrship;\~< 
a modern democracy must be by teaching through reasoned; \J:ia/ 
logue and through articulation of shared ideals as applied to, ~~Ji{ 
crete situations, such that there is a public sense of participatigj:j(l 
any decision made so that it can be truly said: "it is the' ):'>e_o.p)e' 
decision." ii,,\/) 
Based on those three premises one can make a defen~.:o · 
judicial review as democratic and can begin to see at least.. silin. 
of the limitations on the institution. Since democracy is dl:i.fiutihf 
the above premises as that system of government in which gJvh~l 
mental policy is a manifestation of the will of the people thtg,6.gij . 
their leaders, then, if there are ideals which the nation will~' to): 
actualize, and if such ideals (1) are felt to be immutib1¢ :~-n · · 
fundamental to the society it thinks it is and wants to coQtii'li:if tq 
be, (2) and are seen to be sometimes threatened by the n.a:fi~:n's 
will to the immediate end, and (3) are framed in terms of p®•ffeve 
law, it follows that the people can best realize these ideals th:t~i);glt'/ 
a body of leaders which is at once: (a) as immutable a,s ptat~t~f< 
human institutions can be; (b) as removed from the pressµte qfJh,e; 
people's other "will" (i.e., the will to the immediate end) @'. is' 
consistent with the people's choosing its members at all, b11t whfcll 
body likewise will not unnecessarily interfere with or enda:i;tg"er ; 
such other "will", and; whose members are (3) tra,iti,ed' Abd: 
practiced in the interpretation and application of posid:ve· l~~'. 
There are such ideals: the precepts of the Constitution - i~uta!zft!'i\ 
fundamental, supreme positive legal commands - the feqpi!:'f 
13
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Resolution. There is such a body of leaders: The Supreme Court 
of the United States and its extension, the federal (and to an ex-
tent the state) judiciary. Its members are appointed for life sans 
djminishment in pay and are chosen by those leaders who are them-
~elves chosen for their leadership as opposed to their mere reflective 
qJJalities. Thus, as a body and as individual members the court is as 
apolitical as is consistent with choosing it at all. Its members are 
judges. in a court of law and thus are experienced in interpreting 
positive law. And, finally, as a body, it is only a court of law and 
thus cannot unnecessarily interfere with or endanger the People's 
other will. 
' Constitutional I deals As Positive Law 
A final word on "ideals" before discussing the limitations on 
judicial review: The ideals of the Constitution are framed in the 
fashion of positive legal rules and their purport is to establish 
Ittinimum standards of behavior for collective conduct (through 
government) below which such collective conduct can not fall and 
still participate in our broadly shared notion of ourselves as a good 
society. As that notion changes so must the interpretation of the 
ccmstitutional norms change, and just that much. But since these 
norms are framed like positive law, the pouring of new content 
into the words must seem natural, not forced; otherwise the felt 
immutability of the norm will be damaged. Thus, as with the inter-
pretation of any rule, the interpretation must appear to proceed 
from the rule itself and not from the interpreter. 
For example, the words "to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence" .. no doubt originally meant the accused had the right 
to bring his own counsel into court in a criminal trial." But educa-
tion over many years taught most Americans that expert assistance 
is absolutely essential to holding one's own in the esoterica of a 
ttial." Affluence made the cost of providing counsel for the poor 
.setm immaterial. C.Ouple this with the gradual evolution in egalitar-
ian ideals, and it eventually becomes unthinkable that an accused 
should stand trial for a major offense without counsel just because he 
.. u. s. CONST, amend: VI. 
. .. "'"Originally, in England, a prisoner was not permitted to be beard by 
1:9unsel upon the general issue of not guilty on any indictment for treason or 
feJony.'' See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466-68 (1942). See also, Wechskr, 
supra note 14 at 18. 
· ""See Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-463 (l93S). 
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss4/4
340 WEST. VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
cannot afford one."' Thus the ~ords "to have the Assistance of Coun- . 
sel ... " came gradually to "mean" the absolute right to counsel re-
gardl~ of ability to pay and therefore to mean a correlative duty o( 
the state to provide counsel. The gradual enforcement of such 
standard by most state polities through positive law was concrete 
evidence of this new meaning."" Moreover, the right to court-ap• . 
pointed counsel was by 1963 thought to be so fundamental to a £air· 
trial that it had become part of the idea of "due process." Gideon v.: 
Wainwright"" was simply an announcement of that fact.'° 
Constitutional Ideals Versus Other Ideals 
Constitutional ideals are different in kind from the ideals men-
tioned above as the "goals of society", i.e.> the ideal society we want 
to become, that we are (hopefully) in constant progress toward. For 
example, the Four Freedoms of President Franklin Roosevel('i 
were hopes for a future world, but the first two - freedom of speetb:: ,;, 
and freedom of religion - were, for Americans, present reality en-, 
shrined in the Constitution ... That is, they participate in the idea, 
of what we think we are. The second two - freedom from want and 
freedom from fear - were goals for the future, even for American$,, 
They participate in the idea of what we want to become. For tM,<': 
former, the constitutional ideals, the Supreme Court is the para,;, a! 
mount teacher but, of course, not the only teacher. For the latte],};,< 
the ideals as "goals for the future", the President and Congress a~', ( 
the primary teachers. 
Constitutional ideals are different in degree from other valu¢s, . ;: 
that participate in our ideal of the society that is. The ideal "i.it 
can be represented by a hierarchy of values from, say, taxation based:' 
on real ability to pay, through public relief, security for those oµt 
of work for economic reasons, security for the aged and disable<lr 
to secret indictment by grand jury, to freedom of speech. Only tli!;L {:a 
heights of such hierarchy are in the Constitution - only those ·· 
values which are so widely shared as to be felt part of the "common·· . · 
' ~, 
-u . 
• Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (amicus curiae bri¢f 
filed by 22 stat.es) ri,ith Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467-471 (1942). 
• !172 US. 335 (1962), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). . 
""See concuning opinion by Harlan, J. in the Gideon case at 349. See al&o,· 
Israel Gideon v. Wamwright: THE "ART" OF OvERRtJLING, IN Tm: SUPltEM'.E· 
CoURT AND nm CoNsrrnmoN 263 (1965), which criticizes the Court's opinion:, 
by Justice Black for the way in which it overruled Betts . 
.. 2 Great Issues in American H story 39'4·99 (R. Hofstadter ed. 1960) • 
.. U.S. CoNS'I'- amend I. 
1--·~ ·.:V:i+,··--:., · .... · .. -.-...... ~.·,· ····-~------·-···- ··-·-. 
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sense of humanity" and so deeply learned as to be felt immutably 
part of the nature of society as it ought to be. Hence -the phrase -
natural rights of man. 
At the top of the hierarchy of ru·ticulators of constitutional 
ideals is the Supreme Court. But, of course, many voices, from the 
President's, on through other elected officials, to newspapers, school 
teachers, parents, etc., articulate, criticize, inform and form those 
primary ideals and shape and reshape the hierarchy of societal 
values. 
The limits of the Supreme Court's role now concern us. 
n. 
LIMITS INHERENT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION. 
Although it would be silly to suggest that the Supreme Court's 
role can be simply and neatly defined and thus limited, its three 
chief characteristics can be broadly seen as limiting its role. If the 
limits which inhere in its attributes are not observed, the Court 
to that extent loses its legitimacy as a. democratic institution and to 
that extent also loses its effectiveness as a guardian-teacher of con-
stitutional ideals. As was stated above, the Court is legitimately 
democratic because the nature of the people's primary or ·'over 
will," as manifest in its constitutional resolution, needs protection 
from its will to the immediate end. It needs such protection from a 
court of law composed of judges not subject to political recall. Thus 
the Court's three primary characteristics, which by definition limit 
its role are: (a) It is a court of law; (b) It is an independent judi· 
ciary; (c) It interprets the People's Resolution framed in the form 
of positive legal rules. These limits are taken up below in the 
order given. 
Limits to the Court's role arising from 
its character as a co;,..-rt of law. 
The Supreme Court's role is defined by the Constitution as 
extending only to certain "cases" and "controversies,"" i.e., it is to 
be a court of law in the traditional sense. Although there is much 
merit in determining difficult constitutional issues in the context 
of concrete cases,.. it also substantially limits the legitimate role 
.,. U.S. C'DNs'I. art. III . 
.. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.). 
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the Court can play in democratic policy-making. In making this 
point in 1941, at the tailend of the resurgent criticism of judicial 
review caused by the "old guard" "new deal" Court, the late Robert. 
H. Jack.son (later Mr. Justice Jackson) said: 
Judicial justice is well adapted to ensure that estab-
lished legislative rules are fairly and equitably applied to 
individual cases_ But it is inherently ill suited, and never 
can he suited, to devising or enacting rules of general social 
policy. Litigation procedures are clumsy and narrow, at 
best; technical and tricky, at their worst." 
A court of law is limited in its fact"gathering to the particus 
lar incident involved in the case before it. Any evidence beyond 
such dispute is irrelevant_ Therefore, the evidence gathered lacks 
generality. Just the opposite obtains in legislative fact-gather-
ing for policy making. Thus in cases in which ihe decision turns orl 
accepting or rejecting a rule made aft.er legislative fact-gathers 
ing, and where the rule is integral to a scheme for general regula-
tion pursuant to a political policy decision, a court should be chary 
of rejecting such rule based on its limited inquiry. It should in any 
event pay special deference to the legislative decision. Moreover;. 
this consideration should in some kinds of cases absolutely preclude 
tampering with the legislative decision. Such cases are thosi:l 
that can be classed either (I) under the rubric of federalism wheti 
congressional or presidential action is questioned, or (2) under the 
rubric of "substantive due process" or "equal protection of the laws/' '' 
provided that no specific constitutional rule prohibiting the govern, 
mental action can be asserted, or that even from the limited fads 
gathering of a court proceeding the legislative determination 
patently appears to be either purely arbitrary or manifests a clear 
legislative purpose which is contrary to a constitutional ideal_ 
The emphasis here is on the fact-gathering limitations of a 
court hearing - its "hit and miss'' nature, tendency to hard cases, 
and quantity of facts relevant. For example in Railroad Retirement · 
Bd. v. Alton, .. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.," and United States v. 
Butler' the Supreme Court, on the meager record of a law suit 
laced with elaborately unstated judicial notice reversed the find-
ings of Congress as to what affected interstate commerce and what 
.. R. JACKSON, Tm:. S"IRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPIIEMACY 288 (1941)-
.. 295 us. 330 (1935) . 
""' 296 U.S. 238 (1936) . 
48 297 U.S. I (1936). 
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was in the general welfare. True, it enlisted the legalese of deter-
mining "pcwer" and simply brushed aside the legislative findings 
as irrelevant, since questions of "power" are questions of law. But 
the question of power ult.imately turned· on the gathering and 
examination of a myriad of facts about our economy and the inter-
relationship of its parts. Courts are simply unsuited for such work.. 
The same problem obtained in Lochner v. New Yorl/" and the cases 
which struck. down welfare legislation on "substantive due process" 
grounds. The court talked in terms of protecting the right of 
"freedom of contract" (which was simply assumed to be a basic right 
and to be relevant) , but resolved the issues on its own assessment 
of social and economic reality. One is struck on reading these cases 
by the utter presumptuousness of judges. I stress here their presum-
ing to substitute their version of reality (based on evidence from 
a law suit and the judges' own experience) for that of the legisla" 
tive fact-gatherer. Their presuming also to impose their values on 
society will be spoken of later. 
The United :States Supreme Court has long since abandoned 
this presumptuousness in the area ronghly delimited by the words 
"economic'' or "property" rights, but the lesson has not been "un-
learned" by state courts."' Today, however, the same presumptuous-
ness is in full vitality if the talismanic label, human rights, can be 
pasted on the interests of the asserting litigant. Last term, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson"' substituted its 
assessment of reality for that of Congress and 40 to 46 state legisla-
tures in compromising the interest of individuals in interstate travel 
and the interest of state governments in providing adequate welfare 
for its citizens on a sound fiscal basis. The Court did this by the pro-
cess of declaring the right to interstate travel as fundamental (which 
no one would deny) and saying therefore that a compelling state 
interest must be shown (by the state, apparently) to justify any 
classification which serves to penalize that right. But how com-
pelling the state interest is and to what degree the classification pen-
alizes the right to interstate travel are questions of broad social and 
economic fact. The decision of the Supreme Court was, in effect, 
the substitution of its assessment of social and economic reality, 
'"HI& U.S. 45 (1905). 
"'See Hetherington, State Economic Regulations and Substantive Due Pro· 
cess o_f 
Law, 
53 Nw. U. L. REv. 13, (1958) and Paulsen, The Persistence of Sub-
stantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (195D). 
"'394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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arrived at in the cloister of a court of law, for assessment made ; ·. 
over a period of some 30 years by the branch of government specifi"' 
cally suited to gather such legislative facts and make such assessment 
of broad social and economic reality. As is typical of such adjudic~-
tion, the parties to the litigation were examples of those most, ; 
harshly treated by application of the general rule ... This cannot · 
be conducive to an objective assessment of the total picture. 
The inquiry of the Court would have been more appropriately 
confined to determining whether the legislative policy clearly-
ignored proper consideration of the right to travel. The fact tha} 
Congress had imposed a one year upper limit on state residency 
requirements certainly manifested its concern for such rights. · 
The decision goes a long way toward forcing complete federal ( ·•.•· 
control of a matter that through long tradition has been primarily, · 
of local concern. Perhaps a correct assessment of the reality of high-. ,. 
ly mobile modem America would demand federal control. B1Jt '/ 
such "correct assessment" has not been written in the sky or dis,,;,· 
covered in the basement of an ancient temple. Fallible men mus( 
grope for it. What men should they be? Congress, with all i'i$:; 
resources for informing itself, or nine men in a court of law? ··. 
Is it any wonder, then, that the Supreme Court of Appeals of!'~ 
West Virginia presumed to establish the policy for the state hf 
determining the proper majority for lifting property tax ceilings. hf j 
order to aid public schools? If an individual's interest can be elevated{.. 
to constitutional heights and placed under a rubric commanding{; 
wide acceptance (e.g., right to travel, free speech, one man-ou.1:f 
vote) , then despite the inherent limitations of a law suit the Cou:tt:' .'. 
will itself make the legislative judgment, weighing that interest: l'. 
against others of society. Such examples of judicial hubris by thil .. 
recent Court are too numerous to catalogue. Some of the mo:r:~ • 
visible are Baker v. Carr/' Mapp v. Ohio,04 Levy v. Louisiana," In t¢\;" 
Gault, .. and Mirand.a v. Arizona ... The decisions listed are simpi-y' ·: 
"' Id. 
03 369 U.S. 186 (1002). 
""367 U.S. 643 (1961) . 
.. 391 U.S. 68 (1968) . 
""387 U.S. I (1967) • 
.,. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Of course, it was not legislative policy which was 
upset by Miranda, but rather state adminisu-ative and judicial policy in the 
area of criminal law enforcement. Such policy had been worked out throu!\"h. 
long, close, daily experience with the exigencies of local law enforcement. '!"bi( • 
absence of legislative decision correcting the "abuses" found by the Supr~e; ,. 
Court may well be no more than evidence that the sta.te legislative fact gathering , 
19
McLaughlin: What Has the Supreme Court Taught, Part II
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970
WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT TAUGHT? 345 
examples of judicial intrusion into broad policy making, but each 
decision is not necessarily outside the pale of proper constitutional 
a.djudication. The policy involved in In re Gault was at least parti-
ally within the peculiar expertise of judges since it involved court 
procedure for juveniles. It also involved examination of the pre-
mise underlying the relaxation of ordinary due process protection 
''""" the supposed non-punitive nature of juvenile correction. The 
myth of such premise had long since been rather conclusively ex-
posed. The evidence of this, in sources easily available to the court, 
and on a subject that judges are qualified to evaluate, made the 
Court a not inappropriate policy-maker. Nonetheless, the example 
{n Gault of broad policy-making· adds to the overall pattern 
of the image of the Court as intrusive. ·when a pattern is established, 
·. examples apparently comporting with it strengthen its appearance, 
even though the example is supportable individually. 
Another limitation inherent in the Supreme Court's being a 
court of law is its ability to give remedy. The traditional remedies 
' of fine, imprisonment, damages, m1unction and declaratory 
judgment are effective only when the number of people affected is 
telatively small. Since it has neither the power of sword nor purse, 
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter was wont to point out, the Court can 
effect injunctions or declarations that really "run to the world" 
only through moral suasion. 
When the Court acts in areas where its traditional remedies are 
µnavailing, it must either hm,e the cooperation of those enjoined 
. or enlist the support of those who do command the broadly coer-
·ci,ve powern of the state, i.e. the political branches of government. 
Only to the degree that such cooperation or support is forthcoming 
is the decree that runs at large effective. The two primary examples 
of this are the reapportionment cases .. and the school desegregation 
cases.''" In the former there has been more or less willing coopera-
indicated that no general change in administrative policy was warranted. For a 
general criticism of the Court's role in this area of broad public policy see, H. 
fJUENDLY, The·Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure (1967), 235, and A 
Postscript on Miranda, 266 BENCHMARKS: (1967). 
"' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
"'Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ;• Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 349 U.S. 
294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958) ; Griffith v. County School 
B.oard of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (tax supports for private 
a,t.tendance); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430 (1~68) ("freedom of choice" plan); Alexander v. Holmes County Board of 
Educatmn,. 396 U.& 1218 (1969) (immediate desegregation). See also congate 
desegregation cases: e.g., Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 
20
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tion ... In the latter there has been some willing cooperation and some ... 
support from political government. But further desegregation m~~ 
now be a function of further such support. And such support is a . 
function of the moral persuasiveness of the Court. Such moral pet;'. 
suasion comes both from the felt rightness of the decision and frorni 
the prestige of the Court. So far as the latter must be relied on, ju$f 
that far must the moral capital, built up from long tradition,· I:>~ 
~~ . 
Thus the Court has always recognized that it must be vetj,i 
chary of making, with its decisions, promises that must be counter~,: 
signed by others. The risk of so doing ought to be undertaken on1y\\ 
when the constitutional ideal is so compelling and so flouted tfo;t1i' > 
the denial of the ideal causes a sickness in the nation's soul and w¢,;' 
are, as a people, in the quiet of our study, deeply ashamed. An~: 
then only once in a lifetime. That once in our lifetime is schqpf, / 
desegretation, and for that time the Court needs all its "motaf' Y 
capital". The Court can lose that "capital" in other ways, for- i~\ / 
can make unpopular decisions. This the Court has done, and don,(.\" . 
needlessly and wastefully. For this reason alone Engel v. Vitale"'- an4·( >/ 
its progeny .. were improvidently decided. They were not importaitt'. · .•.. 
enough to be worth the loss of "capital". Mere unpopularity is hQtf ) 
sufficient grounds for holding the other way. It is, however, a reasotJr<· 
for not deciding at all, if there is a principled ground for avoidan~Mf( ( 
and the interest protected approaches de minimis."' But unpopu.Ia1;;'.. < 
ity especially gross unpopularity in periods of relative public tta;nt' <X' 
quillity, should cause the Court to give pause, and such pause a~; \: 
will be discussed below, shows Engel to be an unfortunate piece &f( / 
constitution-teaching. ') .. '.} 
A final word on judicially unenforceable decisions: If the Cou~f } 
lacks sufficient moral suasfon, either through the force of mi •< 
U.S. 877 (1955) (public beach) ; Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.6. _879 (~955) _(puWf / 
golf course). All the above decisions were unanimous, m.volvmg nmet~ · ... ·.• 
Jmtices altogether. . ··' · 
""See Part I of this article. 72 W. VA. L. REV. I, 29·30 (1970) . 
., 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (The Regents' Prayer Case). .•> 
•• Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (The Bible Reii.4{ 
ing <:;tses). • h £ "d h Id h b · ····· • Lack of standing was t e g,round or avoi ance t at cou . ave ~µ 
invoked. In fact much doctrine on standing had to be ignored . to reach th.~ . •· 
merits. See Brown, Quis Cusrodist lpsos Custodes? The Sch<>ol Prayer Ca.r!i.i1 · 
1963 The supreme Court Review, I. 15·33; Sutherland, Establishment Accordfri:g 
to Engel, 76. HARv. L. REv. 25, 41-45 (1962) ; lumper, Pr«yer, Public Schools lit!.!.(• 
the Supreme Court, 61 Mice. L. REv. 1001, 1056-1064 (1963) . 
.. See, Sutherland, supra, note 63· . 
.. :·:. -....._, ,,.~ ........ ,.,, ..•... , ., .. 
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ideal articulated or through its prestige, to induce either willing 
albeit begrudging, cooperation or governmental support, then its 
edict goes unobeyed. If the acts of disobedience are open, and the 
edict well known, then the law is flouted. If the flouting is by res-
ponsible public officials, so much the worse for respect for law and 
courts of law. All these conditions obtain to some extent in school 
prayer cases. True the "edict" did not literally run to the world, 
but the language and obvious implication of the opinions is that all 
prayer in public schools is forbidden, if a part of regular classroom 
activity ... To the extent that prayer con.tinues, .. disrespect for law 
and the Supreme Court is fostered. Thus (be prepared to gawk at 
this) the Supreme Court has "taught" that law can be broken with 
impunity and its commands ignored. 
B. 
Limits arising out of the Court's character 
· as an independent judiciary. 
In order that the People's Resolution as to fundamental pre-
cepts could be better kept, the Supreme Court was given the entire 
judicial power and made an independent and coequal branch of 
government. It was given independence so it could be above politics 
- above the storm of transient emotion, above stress and momen-
tary passion, above the tug and pull of faction, interest, and party. 
It was made coequal that it might better h,we the power to refuse 
cooperation with acts of physically powerful and popular arms of 
the government whenever it should feel they violate the People's 
Resolution. The Court's power is rooted in the respect that English 
speaking peoples have long held for law and courts of law. This 
respect for law is manifested by the viability of our Political institu-
"'Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W. D. Mich. 1965). This case repre-
sents a successful effort by a district court judge to work out an accoromodation 
with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) for parents who wanted their children 
to pray. This was accomplished without straining the facts or the law. But see 
Despain v. DeKalb County Community School Di.strict, 255 F. S,upp. 655 (N.D. 
Ill. 1966) where both facts and law were stra-ined. The court seems to be saying 
t.o parents who wanted a federal court to enjoin a kindergarten teacher from 
requiring their daughter to say a simple grace (with the word "Cod" deleted): 
"Ask a silly question, you get a silly answer." 
"" One may only guess the extent to which pra-yer is still a daily activity in 
American schools. Nonetheless I "guess" that whi"le there is very little daily 
pray~r left that is rigidly enforced by supervising authority, there still sub-
sta~t1al prayer intiated at the teacher level. For a study of one community's re-
action to the Prayer Cases see w. Muir, PRAYER IN THE PullLIC ScaooLS - LAW 
AND ATTITUDE C!IANCE (1967), 
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss4/4
348 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
tions - institutions relatively free from revolution violent eith~:r 
in form or substance. This respect for courts of law is manifest in tjkr 
unique, largely judge-made, common law system. Yet, even thotigh 
such respect is necessary to such power, equally necessary is fh_~ 
status of "coequal branch." For in Great Britain there is such t¢s· 
pect, but there is no such power. The American Supreme Court 
was given coequality despite its being independent of popul~r 
recall or other direct pressure, because it was, after all, only a cou}t 
of law exercising only judicial power and thus had "neither FORCE\ 
nor WILL hut merely judgment"."' Thus it should be seen that ti'e: 
Court's independence, coequality and judiciality are interdepeii-\ 
dent qualities. The Court can be independent because it is orjjf) 
judicial. But since it is judicial, it must be independent. It mif{t< 
be coequal so it can be truly independent, and it can be coeqti:il 
even though independent because it is only judicial. Each is a pr~ , 
dicate for the other; each must be maintained for the other to JJ'e, ', 
legitimate. It is largely the people and the palitical branches actirtg 
conjointly under felt constitutional compulsion who have main- .. 
tained and continue to maintain the Court's ooequality and inJ:l~- < 
pendence, but it is for the Court to maintain its judidality whJ~ \ 
justifies such other maintenance. It is limitations inherent in t&b{ 
Court's maintenance of its judiciality that concern us here. " 
For purposes of neatness, if not accuracy, the limitations t@ ' 
be seen as (1) the "power" to settle only judicial disputes, (2} tb'e .• ·· .. 
"right" to answer only judicial questions, and (3) the "duty" t~ 
give only judicial answers. Both the "power'' and the ''right" rel;:i~¢ 
to the Court's jurisdiction, although the second limitation, lack di, 
the right to decide non-judicial (i.e. political) questions, may, a~d \ 
often does, occur in a dispute which is judicial and thus otherwJ~e. ··••·· 
within the Court's jurisdiction. But if the Court lacks the right t? \ 
answer a particular question and if the question must be answe1;¢d } 
to settle the dispute, then the Court effectively lacks the authority: to\: 
settle the dispute. To say a court lacks authority to settle a dispti:je.) 
is the logical equivalent of saying it lacks jurisdiction. All tht{~~ < 
"power", "right", and "duty", are constitutional limitations. Thµ,~ •••• 
if a court lacks the right to answer a question necessary to setd~~ 
ment of the dispute, it really has no power to settle the dispute, i,1, 
its jurisdiction given in one way is ousted in another. As I admitt¢~; 
the trichotomoy of power, right and duty is, in this conttj/)t, 
"'THE FEDE\!.AUST No. 78, at 465 (Mentor Book ed). (A. Hamilton) . 
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convenient but not entirely satisfactory. Moreover, a Judis· 
dictional analysis can be applied to the "duty" in some circum-
stances, for it is a constitutional duty to give only judicial answers. 
If an apparently judicial question cannot be given a judicial answer 
a court cannot answer it, and, perforce, it becomes a non-judicial (i.e. 
political) question; for, if one is asked (say) "Is it A or B?" and if it 
is one's duty either to answer "A" or to answer "B" and thus one has 
no right to give another answer, then if one perceives that the ans-
wer should be "partly A and partly B", one has the duty to say, 
"that is a question I cannot answer.""" Again, if the question is crucial 
to settling the dispute, then though the power to settle appears, and 
the right to answer also, but the question cannot be answered in a 
way consistent with constitutional duty, then there is no right to 
answer and no power to settle. Thus, inability to give a judicial ans-
wer is the logical equivalent of lack of jurisdiction."" But to call this 
"duty" a jurisdictional question would do violence to received 
.. The problem of the ronstitutionability of the so-called "benign quota'; in 
public housing and public schools is a good illustration of the Court's being 
unable to give a judicial answer to an admittedly judicial question. So far the 
Court has simply avoided the issue by refusing to review lower court decisions. 
See, Dalaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y. 2d 193, Cert. denied, 379 U.SJ. 881 (1964); 
School Comm. v. Board of Educ. 352 Mass. 693 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 
572 (1968). See generally, Goldman, Be.rzign Classification; A Constitution 
Dilemma, 35 U. CIN-N. L. REv. 349 (1966); "Developments in the Law - Equal 
Protection," 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1969'); Bittker, "The Case of the Checker-
board Ordinance: An &periment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L J. 1387 (1962); 
Navasky, "The Benevolent Housing Quota," 6 HowAit» L J. 3(} (1960). The 
"benign quota" cases involve a political compromise which attempts to realize 
the goal of ;,:adal integration while recognizing the social reality that when 
more than a certain percentage (say about 30%) of blacks move into a housing 
project or neighborhood all the whites move out. Thus following the strict con-
stitutional principle of legal "color blindness" docs not achieve the real ideal of 
the fourteenth amendment wlrich is total i:iJ.t.e~tion or societal, as opposed to 
simply legal, "color blindness." The fourteenth amendment embodies the ideal 
of what we are now but is more deeply premi;red on an ideal of what we want 
to become, an ideal ''goal'' for the future. As was stated above, such goals are 
for the political branches to articulate and attempt to· actualize. Thus "benign 
q_uotas" create a conflict between the present jdeal and the future ideal goal. 
Smee "benign quotas" help actualize the latter, and the latter is the real premise 
of the f~rmer, "benign quotas" should be upheld. But no neutral principle has 
been artJ.culated for an exception to the constitutional rule of legal "color blind-
n~ss":"""benign quota'• a.re a matter of political expediency. Thus the correct ron-
st1tuuonal answer to the question of integrating housing is not one a court 
bound to announce its decisions only in neutral principles can give. It therefore, is 
duty bound to announce that there is no judicial answer to the constitutional issue 
a~d the political answer must stand. See Bickel, supra note 3, at 60-65. But Prof. 
B1c~el s?-ggest,s a solution to the judicial dil~ of benign quotaS whkh is root-
ed m his notion of the Court's "passive VlrtUff>." Bickel, supra note 3, 111-198. 
That such "virtues" are really "vices" is the leitmotif of this entire section B. 
""However, as is shown below, the duty is breached most commonly not 
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ways of talking about jurisdiction. When a court finds a questfotn } 
that it cannot both dutifully and correctly answer, it usually hoiq\,} 
either that it -is a "political question" or that the answer given by::: 
the political branch must stand, thus affirming such branch's an$w¢r.: 
To analyze more fully each limitation and to discover its obs:¢t-•. 
va:nce anc:i non-observance by the Supreme Conrt, and to adurnhta.k/ 
what the Court thereby teaches, they are taken up serially under tli!!.ii-\ 
familiar rubrics: "power" as "case and controversy" non-juiitic:lfi 
bility; "right" as "political question" non-justiciability; and ''dutyi\<: 
after Professor Wechsler, as "neutral principles" of decision, -· '· i 
(1) The case and controversy limitation 
"Case and controversy" is the rubric under which the fed¢t~l} 
judiciary's constitutional jurisdiction is discussed and, unfort11ni:(t• 
ly, analyzed. Of course, the reason is plain if not sufficient-,-;\_rt,i~~'.e\ 
III states that the "judicial power" shall extend to "all cases" ~j~ / 
certain "controversies". This was early assumed to mean onlv to it£lf/ 
• ! .,..,.;1,,_ :--·. 
cases" and certain "controversies."" What is a "case and controver$yl; \ 
then? Other constitutional language helps a little with the de'·ot\ } 
tion, as Article III adds after the words "all Cases" the p // 
"in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [etc.J:•11 tlie\ 
words "arising under [ etc. J" and the specification of certain t!qr·/ 
troversies are limitations. concerned with federalism. That Iimtfiit\ 
tion is not relevant here. Here the concern is with what the. ;,jJdlCc 
cial" half of the "federal judiciary" means. For this, the wotd$ '!Jh/ 
Law and Equity" are helpful for they suggest that "all easel' ias ) 
meant to convey the idea of cases in the traditional com:tntm, , f~ / 
sense. Justice Frankfurter suggested that "cases" means: "Gen.er~ly 
speaking the business of the colonial courts and the courts of W~t/ 
given. Even here the Court is, in one sense, acting ultra viTes but it is, i,n :~e ?j 
same sense that a servant acts negligently for his master, which acts,, (Qir pl;it- \ , 
poses of common law liability, are said to be authorized.. ' , ,,, , 
•• 
Bickel, 
supra note 3 at 114-115. 
n US. Const. art. Ill, 2. The full paragraph reads: , 
The judicial Power shall ex.tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,_ 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United State\!, ajic:l 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - tr;> all.. 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - tQ ill 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Juri.roiction; - to Controvep;ies to 
which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two 
or more States; - between Citizens of different States - betwe;¢n_ 
Citizens of the same State clajming lands under Grants-of different States, 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citiz¢ns 
or Subjects. 
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minister when the constitution was framed.""' This definition would 
include, of course, those matters for which the legislative authority 
of the state authorizes judicial remedy, whether or not the particular 
remedy was part of the "Law and Equity" at the time the Constitu-
tion was adopted.'" But Frankfurter's dictum has never been adopted 
,, by the court as its guideline. Moreover, the recent case of Flast. v. 
Cohen" suggests that the rubric "case and controversy" has given 
way to the word "standing" as the· operative language by which to 
examine the threshold constitutional-juris.dictional issue.'·' And, con-
trary to what Juliet might have thought, there is something in a 
name, at least for abstractions if Jiot for roses and young men. In 
fact the "name" may be the "thing". In any event, Flast v. Cohen 
was a sharp break with tradition; it typifies the present Court's 
attitude toward itself, the other branches and the Constitution; it 
js illegitimate; and it teaches attitudes that are both undemocratic 
and corruptive of the respect necessary to the authority of the 
elective branches. In order to demonstrate that Flast v. Cohen is- all 
of that, a fresh analysis of the "case and controversy" limitation may 
be useful. 
As suggested above the limitation called "case and controversy" 
could be better described as the power to settle "only judicial dis-
putes." _Both words, "judicial" and "disputes," have a distinct con-
stitutional derivation and meaning. "Judicial" comes from both 
the Article III language "judicial Power" and the notion that cer-
tainly obtained in 1789 and still largely obtains today that "cases 
in law and equity" describes judicial, as oppased to political, dis-
putes. Moreover the words "case and controversy" suggest a 
''d_i~ute", not merely a legal "question." I have suggested that in 
this context there is something in a name and am now suggesting 
Qiat the better name to describe the threshold constitutional-juris-
dktional issue in a federal court is "judicial disputes." Thus a "case 
~nd controversy" is a "judicial dispute", nothing more nor less. 
· ''Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149', 150. (1951) 
(ro~curring opinion); to the same effect see Coleman v. Miller, 30.7 U.S. 433, 
4llo (1939) (concurring opinion). 
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). 
'le 392 U.S. S-3 (1968). 
•• Of course this change did not just suddenly happen; it has been in pro-
g-re,ss for at least thirty years. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) 
(c»ncurring opinion of Frankfurter J.). It is of some significance that the word 
"st\i,nding" is not used in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) to 
char.i,cterize the taxpayer's suit not being a "case or controversy." 
II 
1 ~~ii! 
i 'i (~I· ,;,,,,1 
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What then are judicial disputes? Well, to begin with a tauto-
logy, the settlement of judicial disputes is the governmental func-
tion of courts of law, and a court of law is that part of government 
that settles judicial disputes. A "dispute" as opposed to a "question", 
" r:ic'" v:rrn i~ nsed here, involves the problem of whether or not 
some governmental action be taken - coercive or non-coercive--
regu1 atory, proprietary, or defensive. Traditionally, judidal dis-
putes are those disputes that involve coerci11e'" action against parti-
cular, named individuals. By contrast, legislative disputes over coer-
cive action involve the use of coercion against generally defined 
individuals. Such legislative action is more commonly referred to 
merely as "regulative" since actual coercion is almost solely a judi-
cial function. In fact, in common law countries almost all" domestic 
use .of the coercive power of the state is channeled through judicial 
tribunals where the particular facts calling for coercion are develop-
ed and the law calling for coercion is interpreted with particular 
reference to the developed facts."' An even broader generalization 
can be made: a politically civilized society is at least a society in 
which all normative violence is channeled through the state, and all 
state violence through courts, and all non-normative violence is 
punished by the state. 
But, traditionally, courts have not cooperated in the non-coer-
cive actions of government. For instance, the government has the 
power to spend from the general revenue, to acquire and manage 
property for general use and to raise and maintain armed forces for 
·"'By "coercive action" is meant actual physical coercion, not the felt coer-
cion of a seeming Hobson's choice, although most judicial action is effected by 
only threatening to i;oerce, i.e., an in_junction, money judgment, even declaratory 
relief, usually is "voluntarily" complied with, But what makes these remedies. 
peculiarly judicial is that the court will order its officers actually to take your 
money, sell your property, or put your body in jail. If an injunction were coercive 
per se then so would be the threatened penalty of the criminal law. But the 
actual coercion of the criminal Jaw is accomplished through the courts. So also 
the actual coercion· of an injunction follows the contempt proceeding, as an ad-
junct to the original order. The distinction between criminal and civil action in 
this context is merely one of time: the civil order allows one an opportunity 
to comply voluntarily before it a.ctuaUy pushes; the criminal judgment itself 
pushes. My stark use of the word "coercion .. is an effort to cut through abstrac-
tions and imprecision to the physically concrete wherever it is possible in this 
"amorphous" area of "case and contrOversy" and "standing." See Flast v. Cohen, 
392 Us. 83, 99 (1968). 
"'Theoretically it is "all" but there are exceptions for such exigencies as 
riot or initial police arrest and detention. Even legislative contempt is usually, 
although not necC$Sarily, channeled through the judiciary. 
"See United States v. B.rown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) cf. Morey v. Doud., 354 
U.S. 457 (1957) . . 
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defense. These functions of government are not lawmaking in the 
regulatory sense, although to be sure, when the legislature exercises 
them, they do so by the same mode of action as when they are 
regulating behavior, i.e. by legislative act. Of course, in certain ways 
the non-coercive functions of government demand coercive help and 
therefore are often exercised with the cooperation of the judiciary. 
For instance, spending demands taxing and the coercive power of 
tax collection is channeled through the courts. When a tax is tied to 
a particular spending program and the courts are asked to cooper-
ate in coercing payment of the tax, the constitutionality of the 
spending program can be challenged by way of challenging the 
tax legislation of which it is inextricably a part."' A taxpayer is even 
permitted to do this in an action for declaratory relief where the 
coercion of payment is imminent."" Likewise, the acquisition of pro-
perty often involves coercing a sale, and this power of eminent do-
main is channeled through the courts. In either instance, getting 
money or property," the state is empowered to coerce and a judicial 
dispute, i.e. a "case", arises because of the need, stemming from 
long, deeply embedded tradition, to channel the coercive authority 
of the state through the courts_ But the legislative spending or 
taking is challenged only incidentally to such suits to coerce. They 
are simply instances where the courts have traditionally been asked 
to cooperate in governmental coercion and will refuse such coopera-
tion if in the court's- opinion the action would violate the people's 
resolution. 
A case like Baker v. Carr raises the further question of whether 
or not the legislature can enlarge this area of cooperation, i.e. 
whether Congress can make a "case in law" that was not one tradi-
tionally_ For instance, courts have not traditionally been asked to 
cooperate in legislative apportionment. However, a federal juris-
dictional statute authorized, to put it in language used here, the 
federal courts to cooperate in coercing protection of interests guar-
anteed by the federal Constitution against state action. It did so by 
authorizing suits against "persons" acting "under color" of state or 
territorial law and not by direct suit against the sovereign state.'"' 
Nonetheless, actions under the Civil Rights Acts are in reality 
... See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Stewart Machine Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
""Nashville, C. & Sc L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). 
"'"Or soldiers," it could be added. 
"'42 u.s.c. § § 1983, 1988. 
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss4/4
354 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
actions to coerce the state government to act or refrain from acting. 
Moreover, the judicial machinery of coercion can be invoked by 
private citizens. Traditional notions of a private law suit are main-
tained by requiring that the individual seeking to invoke the 
judicial .machinery have a "private right" violated or some "personal 
stake" in the outcome, i.e. some interest in the coercion that is dif-
ferent from the public's interest generally. Of course, this is now 
caIIed standing to sue. Moreover, the fact that the suit is brought 
against "persons" (usually those charged with executing the law) 
has the distinct ring of a writ of mandamus. 
A Baker v. Carr type case does not, therefore, present any "case 
and controversy" problem. The judicial machinery of coercion is pro-
vided and authorized by the lawmaker. The problem concerns who 
should invoke sud1 machinery and that is purely a question of stand-
ing. Nonetheless the Civil Rights Acts, when all the paraphernalia of 
a private law suit is stripped away, allow a private citizen to sue a 
government in the name of a higher law. There is also a higher law 
over the federal government. Thus it is natural to ask: 1iVhy should 
it not also be coerced into compliance with the higher law by the 
judiciary? If some governments can be enjoined to do their con-
stitutional duty, why not all governments since they are all under 
the Constitution? At least, ought not the issue be examined the 
same way the Civil Rights jurisdiction is examined, i.e. in terms 
of "standing" to invoke the judicial machinery? Furthermore, this 
reasoning goes, the Bill of Rights is a limitation on the federal 
government and gives us "personal rights" against certain of its 
actions. Moreover, in the area roughly delimited as "administrative 
law", strictly public interests can be vindicated by strictly private 
persons invoking the judicial machinery of coercion. If public inter-
ests can be so protected against violations by non-governmental 
action {usually in the person of large corporation), then why can-
not public interests (identified and ensh...iined in the Constitution) 
likewise be protected against governmental action? Therefore, by 
analogy to either Civil Rights or administrative law, the standing 
issue also is resolved in favor of allo'wing (say) a federal taxpayer, 
vindicating his own "right to freedom from establishmentarianism" 
or the public's interest in non-establishment, to challenge a Congres-
sional spending program. financed by appropriation from the general 
revenues. And if the suit is not against Congress but against an 
executive officer who will administer the spending act, why then all 
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the more obviously it is just another lawsuit like mandamus or 
injunction. And there you have Flast v. Cohen.a, And this despite 
the· square holding to the contrary by· a unanimous Court in 
Frothingham v. Mellon."' But wait, there the "right" or the "public 
interest" for which vindication was sought was in the tenth amend-
ment, not the Bill of Rights, so the analogies to standing from the 
civil rights cases and the largely later developments in administra-
tive law did not obtain. Thus it could be distinguished. Or so it 
seemed. 
However, the Court in F7.ast misconceived the problem and 
talked about the wrong issue. First, the Court's holding in Froth-
ingham v. Mellon was squarely rooted in the separation of powers."" 
Second, the Court in Flast equated the "dispute" aspect of the case 
and controversy limitation with the appropriateness of "issues" 
for judicial resolution. Clearly the constitutional "issue" raised in 
Flast v. Cohen is meet for judicial resolution, as was the constitu-
tional "issue" raised in Frothingham. They were both also meet 
for resolution by the political branches and had there been resolved. 
Now, if a "judicial dispute" arose which raised those "issues," then, 
of course, the Court would be duty bound to render its own inde-
pendent judgment on the constitutional issue in resolving the dis-
"'392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
84 262 u.s.- 447, 486 (1923). 
85 "The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To 
the legislative department has been committed the duty of making 
laws; to the exerutive the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary 
the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought 
before the courts. The general rule is that neither department may in-
vade the province of the other and neither may control, direct or 
restrain the action of the other. We are not now ~peaking of the 
merely ministerial duties of officials." Id. 488. 
The reference to the "merely ministerial duties of officials" is of great 
significance. The Court is here referring · to the function of the writ of man· 
damns or the analogous .use of injunction in the federal courui to command 
executive action. Of course, the traditional use of such remedies was not to 
control discretion but to command action of the executive clearly enjoined by 
law. His this power to enjoin executive action which, I would guess, persuaded 
the Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), to assume (apparently uncon-
sciously) that there existed judicial machinery of coerciqn, and to skip to the 
que~tion of who could invoke it. But the court in Frothingham did not at all 
a~ume it existed. In fact, the Court in Frothingham quite as casually assumed it 
did not exist as the Court in Flast assumed it did exist; at least, that s=s a 
fair inference firnm the c.asual language: "We are not speaking of the merely ... " 
(from the above quotation). But as pointed out in the text, the broad use of 
the federal injunctfon to control state governments and the use of the word 
"'standin1;(' with connotations borrowed from administrative law have entirely 
changed the perspective of the _Supreme Court as to what the il!Sue is in "case 
and controversy" qu~tions. 
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pute. But by equating "issue" with "dispute" the Court slipped right 
by the cornerstone of the holding in Frothingham, and into the 
more commodious doctrine of standing, civil rights and administra-
tive law style. But the latter cases can be seen as not truly raising 
the case and controversy issue for, as pointed out above, each in-
volved a judicial dispute, i.e. in an authorized application of govern-
mental coercion to particular entities. The issue was only as to who 
could invoke the judicial application. If the civil rights cases are 
examined, it is seen that the organ, the Constitution, announcing 
~ the "civil rights" did not itself create any remedy for their coerced 
vindication. To be sure, in most instances, such rights are self. 
executing in that they can be raised as defenses in state suits to coerce 
compliance with some state policy. Thus if a positive legal right is 
seen as an interest coupled with a governmental remedy, then the 
three Civil War amendments created, full blown, positive legal 
rights which could be ultimately policed by the Supreme Court with 
its appellant supervision over state courts. But all three amendments 
also empower Congress to enforce each amendment by appropriate 
legislation. By virtue of such power, Congress authorized the federal 
courts to enforce such rights by affirmative law suit. In other words 
the federal government, under its constitutional authorization, 
channeled, in time-honored fashion, its coercive activity through 
the courts. Only here the coercion was directed at state government. 
The existence of a judicial dispute is even plainer in the adminis-
trative law cases. There the organ, legislative act, announcing the. 
remedy also identified the interest to be protected. Thus the whole 
right (i.e. interest coupled with the judicially channeled coercion) 
came from one source; there was no constitutional right and no 
government to be coerced and thus no confusion as to the nature 
of the "case in Law": it was a traditional one ... 
.. A further word must be added here as to the "administrative law" influ-
ence on the decision in Flast. Professor Louis L. Jaffe is, with little doubt the na-
tion's foremost authority on judicial control of administrative action. He is very 
much in favor of al1owing what he calls "non-Ho!feldian" plaintiffs to in-
voke the judicial machinery to protect public interests against private 
persons who are regulated by the great federal administrative agencies. Tradi-
tionally, public interests have been protected by public attorneys or agents in-
voking the judicial machinery. The reasons for this are twofold: (I) by channel-
ing the invocation of the court's powers through public agents, a multiplicity of 
suits is avoided, and an initial responsible screening vi assumed, and; (2) the 
conceptual difficulties with received notions that a private lawsuit demands 
a personal '"right" or personal · stake in the litigatimi in order ro state a cause 
of action. 
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Now in Flast v. Cohen, it was the Bill of Rights which created 
the limitations. It contains no authorization to a superior govern-
ment to coerce an inferior government to comply. Again these 
limitations are usually seen as individual rights· because they can 
be raised as defenses in a government suit to coerce compliance with 
some federal policy. As was stated, all such governmental coercion, 
not only by tradition but through constitutional command, must 
be channeled through the courts, therefore all governmental action 
that directly affects individuals is judicially supervised. If a constitu-
tional issue is thereby raised the judiciary must pass on it unless 
the issue itself is. appropriate only to political resolution (see be-
low). But when there is no governmental coercion present or threat-
ened, there can be no "judicial dispute." And that is what the 
Court meant in Frothingham when it said: 
"We have no power per se to review and annul acts of 
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. 
That question can be considered only when the justifica-
tion for some. direct injury suffered or threatened, present-
ing a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. 
Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declar-
ing the law applicable to the controversy. It amounts to 
little more than the negative pawer to disregard an uncon-
stitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the 
way of the enforcement of a legal right. The party who in-
vokes the power must be able to show not only that the 
statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is in im-
mediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as the 
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers 
in some indefinite way in common with people generally. 
If a case for preventive relief be presented the court en-
In many administrative-i:regulatory schemes Congress has authorized the 
initiation of lawsuits by private persons who have little more than the public 
interest at stake. Thus Congress. has authorized a sort of "private attorney gener• 
al" (Judge Jerome Frank's phrase) to bring suit, simply ignoring the two tradi-
tional reasons for not doing so. Of rouu;e, Congress had every right to do this, 
See FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Scenic Hud-
son Preserv!l,tion Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (Zd Cir. 1965), H<J\vever, 
sometimes, the motive for sticking with tradition appears to stem mainly from 
the judge's predisposition against the particular private litigants. See FCC v. 
Sanders Brothers Radio Station, supra, at 20·2'1, (dissenting), opinion of Douglas 
and Murphy J. J.) Professor Jaffe has waged a continuing battle against such 
tradition-bound thinking, his latest effort aimed primarily at the second, or 
~n~tual, ~ditio!lal rea:ion H?r not allowing private standing. Jaffe, The 
C_ztizen as Litigant 111 Public Actzom: The Non-Ho!feldian or IdeologicoJ Plain-
tiff, 116 U. P3: L. Rev. 1033 (1968) • But the traditional reasons for public at-
torneys are sunply not relevant to the case and controversy limitation, and 
Jaffe's advice on the latter matter is misconceived and has misled, · 
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joins., in effect, not the execution of the-slatute, but the acts 
of -the _ official, the _ statute not withstanding. Looking 
through the forms of words to the substance of their com-
plaint, it is merely that officials of the executive depart-
ment of government are executing and will execute an 
act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this 
we are to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judi-
cial controversy, but to assume a position of authority 
over the governmental acts of another and co-equal depart-
ment, - an authority which plainly we do not possess.""' 
~ If there be talk of standing in the above, it is standing to raise 
constitutional issues when the government is currently coercing or 
is threatening immediately to coerce the one seeking relief. But 
"direct injury" must mean, when taken in conjunction with the 
words ·"the court enjoins ... the acts of the official, the statute not 
withstanding", that the government is about to take one's life, or to 
take (or withhold) one's property or one's physical liberty in some 
way. If "one's physical liberty" gives pause, then realize that if it is 
other than physical liberty, the limitation is gone. For if liberty 
means merely options for action, then nearly every act of govern-
ment-regulatory, proprietary, or defensive-cuts down those options 
and interferes with liberty. Of course deprivation of physical liberty 
includes being banished from the country as well as imprisonment 
or detention. Nearly every regulation of government, in order to 
force compliance, carries with it a threat to physical possessions or 
physical liberty. All actualizations of the threatened depriyation 
give ri_se to judicial disputes. It is not the liberty that the regula-
tion, or tax, or spending deprives one of that creates the judicial 
controversy, it is the imminence of the coercion to compJy-"not the 
execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute, not-
withstanding." The deprivation of liberty in the broad sense may 
well be, and probably will be, the subject of the constitutional 
"issue" raised in the "judicial dispute" but it does not create the 
.dispute. 
Therefore, there was no more a judicial dispute in Flast v. 
Cohen than there was in Frothingham v. Mellon. Therefore, there 
was no jurisdiction. and therefore, the Court was unlikely, under 
the Frothingham standard. ever to have an opportunity to pass on 
the constitutionality of the act of Congress which, incidentally to its 
main provisions, gives financial aid to Catholic schools .. This the 
"'262 U.S. 447, 486, at 488 (1923) (emphasis added). 
;,.,··=.=~- ~--·· ,,.,~~--.... -... -~ ..... _.. ..... -- -·-
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Court could not abide." Now it is 1mdeniable that such an act is con-
stitutionally suspect; but it is a question about which reasonable men 
could differ." Congress had scrupled over the constitutional issue 
with special care, and. as Mr. Justice Holmes obsei:ved, "legislatures 
are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in 
quite as great a degree as the courts." .. But no matter to the present 
Court: Why, if Congress could pass an unconstitutional act immune 
from Supreme Court revision, Congress would, like a bunch of 
children when the teacher's gone, run wild!111 
This same Court in another era carried such judicial hubris to 
the brink of self destruction and prompted the following outburst 
by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in dissent: 
A tortured construction of the Constitution is not to be 
justified by recourse to extreme examples of reckless Con: 
gressional spending which might occur if courts could not 
prevent - expenditures which, even if they could be 
thought to effect any national purpose, would be possible 
only by action of a legislature lost to all sense of public res-
ponsibility. Such suppositions are addressed to the mind 
accustomed to believe that it is the business of courts to sit 
in judgment on the wisdom of legislative action. Courts 
are not the only agency of government that must be assum-
ed to have the capacity to govern. Congress and the courts 
both unhappily may falter or be mistaken in the perfor-
mance of their constitutional duty. But interpretation of 
our great charter of govcrnment which proceeds on any 
assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of 
our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the 
three branches of government, or that it alone can save 
them from destruction, is far more likely, in the long run, 
to obliterate the constituent members of an indestructible 
union of indestructjble states than the frank recognition 
that language, even of a constitution, may mean what it 
says: that the power to tax and spend includes the power to 
relieve a nationwide economic maladjustment by condition-
al gifts of money."' 
.. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98, 111 (concurring opinion of Douglas J.), 
116 (concurring opinion of Fortas J.), 133 (dissenting opinion of Harlan J., 
referring to "Court's unarticulated premise"), 
,. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1680 (1968) 
and compare. with Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) and Urinan, 
~oes State Aid to Church Related Colleges Constitute an Establishment of Reli-
g1on~-Reflections on the Marylalnd College Cases, 1967 UTAH L Jo:v. 491. 
.,_ 
Muisouri, Kansas, 
& Texas R. C.O. v. May, 19! U.S. 267, 270 (1904) . 
. . Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. S3, at 98 & n. 17; and id. at 107-114 (concurring 
op1ruon of Douglas J.). 
""United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. l, 87-88 (1936) (emphasis added). 
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To reiterate, the Court can be independent and coequa1 ~'e, 
cause it is "only a court of law exercising only judicial power/' Bii{ 
if the idea of "cases and controversies" can be expanded and c9'o/ 
tracted by the judges' subjective definition based on their idea of 
the necessity of intervention, then the basis of allowing inclepi:n-( 
dence and coequality is destroyed. Rather, the definition of "iw;e{ 
and controversies" must be independent of the judges. Of c01Jk~} 
any standard that is independent of the judges must itself be fo ... 
terpreted by the judges - but the word "independent" implles ®s 
much, at least, that is useful: the focus of the Court's interpreta1::ibn 
must be on ascertaining what the creator of the standard intende~{;i·)' 
the words when viewing the "ordinary" usage of the words iu th.I: 
context of their use. And that is something entirely differel),t, ~~( }H 
cognitive process, from deciding purely by one's own standard ie 
appropriateness of judicial intervention. · ,, 
I have suggested that focus on the phrase, "in Law and Eqµ~"tf'> 
provides some guide to the meaning of the words "cases" an.d •\'i~p; 
troversies" intended by the writers of the Constitution. But e*tn 
Frankfurter did not use the phrase "in Law and Equity." It is wo:fi$§ 
of note that the opinion of the court in FlllSt v. Goh.en dism}i,i¢d< 
Frankfurter's dictum, quoted above,"" by asserting that at the #file 
the Constitution was drafted "the power of English .iudges to .ffil-
der advisory opinions was well established." .. However, this is ertt.µ-e-
ly irrelevant to Frankfurter's statement. Nobody ever contett&ed) 
that "advisory opinions" are rendered in "cases". In fact, the· ,Very< 
words "advisory opinions" import an opposite meaning. Ad:vi$bry/ 
opinions lack finality - they bind no one, whereas no 011~: "tar} 
doubt that a case at law or equity, by definition, does. Thus F'f~,;ik-} 
furter was not saying jurisdiction is limited by the entire pra<;t;jce 
of judges in colonial times, judicial and extrajudicial, but rai4er 
by the judicial practice in colonial times. In neither Co/en'ltl~)v. 
Miller nor Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath does Ft~(' 
furter make this entirely dear. Perhaps the phrase "in Law ipd. 
Equity" would have helped. " ••.• 
Moreover, it was not restraint in allowing enlargement 9£ µti( 
own power that prompted Chief Justice Jay, Chief Justice Taiijy,/ 
Mr. Justice Gray and others to decline the invitation to give adyi$~ry\ 
opinions. Nor was it the "lack of concreteness" that "sharJ?~nt 
"'See note '72, supra. 
.. 392 U.S. 83, at 96 (1968). 
........... ... .......... . ·..==.::.~ .c.::, -~-~ -"i -~-"""ill:= . 
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issues", etc. Rather it was jealousy to protect the judicial power. In 
Muskrat v. United States, .. and the cases it relied on, it was the 
lack of finality, i.e. the fact that the advice need not be taken, 
that prompted the refusal. The British law lords gave advice when 
3csked, but they have never had the power to review the acts of 
J{_ing or Parliament. The British judges are underlyings. Advisors 
;u-e perforce underlings. Sovereigns give orders, not advice. But 
once a "co mm and er" begins to give more advice, as John 
Jay surely sensed, the authority of his commands is weakened. The 
habit of obedience gives way when obedience need not always be 
given. Of course, that was one fear voiced above (Section A) in 
regard to the Court's giving orders to which it could not command 
obedience. Courts in Anieric.a always settle disputes by giving orders, 
some of which are commands that the order of another and coequal 
pranch of government shall not be obeyed. But surely a corollary to 
$at power, else the power cannot be reconciled with its grant (and 
thus with democracy), is that it be used only to settle judicial dis-
putes. 
All this is to say that the definition of "cases and controversies", 
as an objective jurisdictional limitation, is purely a function of the 
separation of powers and the continuing justification of the Court 
as a coequal branch. In Flast v. Cohen, the Court skirted the real 
fasue when it shifted emphasis from standing as a way of expressing 
}jm.itations on the kind of dispute it could settle, to one of limita· 
tj_ons on the appropriate disputants, which led to considerations 
merely of "concreteness". The reliance in Flast was then placed on 
cases where jurisdiction to settle the kind of dispute was arguably 
given by special grant of Congress and the issue was standing .in 
what Bickel calls the "impure" sense. The inquiry in these "impure" 
standing case is properly focused not on jurisdiction, but on the 
discretionary question of appropriateness of the suitor in terms of 
"personal stake" and appropriateness of the issues in terms of "ripe-
ness" or "mootness". 
It is significant that the two cases closest in point to Flast 
were each squarely decided in terms of jurisdiction. These cases 
were disingenuously distinguished in Flast by carving a rule arbund 
them having nothing to do with separation of powers, which was 
their basis. If Frothingham v. Mellon "talks" in certain places about 
the policy behind the Court's decision in terms more appropriate 
00 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
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to non.jurisdictional standing, that does not change the cleat hqJd~ ) 
ing or the main thrust of its rationale. Nor should it create dou~ts\ 
about the "true" nature of the holding. What it does show fs d~i) 
tyranny of words and the confusions engendered by forcing: iie i, 
word, here "standing'', to signify several concepts. ·, ; 
Perhaps it is too late in our history to resurrect the phra$e •1,i~)/ 
Law and Equity" (never mud1 used anyway) and ask it to do &¢r~/ 
vice in a cause apparently already lost. Marshall's philosophy· it>E<i 
deciding a constitutional issue only if the Court happened tQ g~li.t\ 
in the course of its regular judicial duties has given way, appareittty,:}: 
to one of taking jurisdiction if the Court thinks the constitlltiotl,'.aJ fo 
issue is. important. The most discouraging thing about Flast is df;t)) 
the lone dissenter, Justice Harlan, did not predicate his opinion.·~~/ 
want of jurisdiction. ·. ;t <:. 
And what does Flast v. Cohen "teach"? It teaches the idea tha( 
constitutional issues must be decided by the Supreme Court ii/~t/ 
all possible; that the other branches of government cannot be trus'~¢~( 
with any part of this sacred task. Because of the esoteric Ilp,.ture!"'~f< 
standing and jurisdiction, Flast is bench.and-bar-focused teadH~JiJ 
But the Flast example cannot help but mightily reinforce,....::i:t le'~~1:: 
for what Professor Dahl calls the "political stratum" - the pat(~µ 
of judicial ubiguity and potency. If you lose in the Iegislatur¢, g~.j~) 
the courts. The legislatures are staffed with children· anyw?,y. : : {,' 
Did Flast not help teach the losers in Roane County whei'¢• J>\ ) 
g<:ii? Did it not add to the impression the West Virginia OJ#h f/: 
received, that it ought to let them in? And did it not help te:=tdi: ~,; ? 
court to presume to decide the political issue involved? Adami'~{/ 
the Parable, might have said: 
Samuel, we never cooperated in that area before and J 
didn't specially provide for it here, though I thought of it. 
I worried within myself very long and hard because I kllew 
I would not have your guidance. Now without my say so 
you volunteer your advice and <lain to make it a command, 
My rule was: My servants each in their place~ none master 
of the other, none master of me. Perhaps Guardian was too 
large a word for you. You have become proud and arrogant 
- and you spoke of "overweening other servants." 
(2) The "political question" limitation. ,, / 
Since the Court has only judicial power it cannot answer politf~; / 
cal questions. Moreover since its having only judicial 
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cQpstitutional predicate of its being independent and coequal (i.e. 
of the Court's having the power of "judicial review"}, it has no 
constitutional right to attempt to answer political questions. As 
w,i,s pointed out above, that means it has no power to settle disputes 
that tum on the resolution of political questions, i.e. jurisdiction 
initially given, assuming a "case or controversy", is lost. In the usual 
case, then, existence 0£ a crucial political question is not a matter 
of self-restraint, it is a question of power. This does not avoid the 
bard question of what a non-justiciable political question is. And 
to answer that question requires a high order of judgment because 
t> tp.e standard is so elusive and vague."' But just because broad dis-
cre::tion must be exercised to answer the question, the question itself 
sllould not change. But it has. And this change in the underlying 
q1;1estion from one of jurisdiction to the appropriateness of its exer-
cise has changed the answer-for, if you will pardon the expression, 
"ask a flabby question, you get a flabby answer." 
For example, would it not have made a difference in Baker v. 
Cari" that Coleg;rove v. Green"' had been decided squarely in terms 
• ' .of jurisdiction? In other words, if the;: Court in Baker had approach-
. ei,i the "palitical question" issue as one of jurisdiction, would it not 
have viewed that issue differently? Would it not have constrained 
tb;e Court to carve out a narrow rule? Such constraint should come 
frmn the corollary to viewing justiciability as jurisdictional. In 
Marshall's famous words: "We have no more right to decline juris-
diction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The 
one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.""' Thus once 
""The Court in B<Xkerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), begins its discussion of the 
pq]itical question doctrine by stating that it has "attributes which, in various 
settings, diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness." 
Id. at 210. But the OJurt does conclude with the following "test": 
"Prominent on the sunnce of any case held to involve a political 
question is found [11 a textually demonstrable constitutional commit· 
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [21 a lack. of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
· .[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impoo:sibility of 
a. court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lad 
Qf respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or [6J the Potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
IQ.ellts by various departments on one question." Id. at 217. I do not 
undertake here a general discussion of the political question doctrine-
ground heavily plowed in legal literature. 
"'Id. 
" 328- U .s. 549 (1946) . 
.. Gohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821). 
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a Baker v. Carr type case is found to be within the Court's jurisdic. 
tion, all such cases must be taken unless distinguishable, and such 
taking would be entirely a function of the standard by which the· 
prototype was let in. Thus rigor in defining the jurisdictional 
standard will be compelled or else the Court will find itself em, ... 
barrassed into taking cases it really does not think appropriate, foi'··r: 
any one of the various "discretionary" reasons given in Baker v.' "'' 
Carr for not getting involved in the nation's politics. Such a rigoroU$ 
and narrow rule could have been fashioned in Baker v. Carr and it .,; \ 
would have avoided both the flabbiness of the present justiciabilitf/}/ 
standard and the narrowness and simplicity of the rule on the ···· 
merits, "one in.an, one vote", which rule was a betrayal of the original 
thrust, rationale and aim of Baker and grossly oversimplified a ... ,; 
complex problem.10• 
Because Baker so clearly illustrates the lesson of judicial over. 
reaching, ~t must again be reiterated that "one man, one vote" as 1( 
rule for apportioning legislative representation implies a particular 
kind of republican government and one which is not reflected 
by the way the national republic is constituted. The result of ovet•. ,, > 
reaching in the resolution of the "political question" issue in Baker, · ? 
led ineluctably to that standard which is premised in the resolution, ·' · 
of as clear a Guaranty Clause issue as could be framed. The pre\,:J : 
mises and conclusion were not "given 'republican government' an&·.''. ·.·· 
'equal protection of the laws' then a particular type of republican: ' 
government is implied, i.e. representatives as pure delegates." That 
would be defensible as not a Guaranty Clause decision. Rather th~,,;~· 
premises and conclusion were "given a particular type of republicai"i. 
government" called "pure delegate" and given "equal protection'\ 
then "one man, one vote" follows.'"'- But the Court got to that pro,. 
100 See discussion in Part I of this article, 72 W. VA. REv. l, 23-31. 
""Remember, all that "equal protection of the law:." means ordinarily is: 
rational classification for different treatment. Such classification is perforce not 
rational if based on invidiousness, i.e., on prejudice which is nearly always assum~ 
ed to be ixrationaL No such invidiousness can be found or has ever been found 
in the apportionment cases. The 0:mrt as much as admitted in Baker that there 
are many rational plans for apportionment. The issue was whether or not th¢ 
Tennessee appoin_tment scheme under attack in the underlying "merits" case in 
Baker "reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action". Baker v. 
Carr, 369 rns. 186, at 226 (1962) (emphasis in original) • Thus republican 
government and equal protection demand only a rational plan, and which of 
several "rational p1ans" is to be the plan is a question to be decided m the politi-
cal arena. Only if a particular theory of "republican government is adopted as . 
. the only allowable "meaning" of republican government, and that theory is 
pure delegate or pure "reflector", does the oonjunction with equal-protection-
rationality demand mathematically equal population districts, 
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position backwards and have yet to acknowledge even that they got 
there at all. By not having a dear standard to justify their inter-
vention and by using a standard for non-justiability stated in terms 
of negatives, one of which (and apparently the only one of immedi-
ate relevance for the Court) was "lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it", the majority was impelled 
toward finding a manageable standard for resolving the con-
stitutional issue- Thus to prove, after the fact, that the issue was 
justiciable, they found the only standard a court could both manage 
and discover, "one man, one vote'', and that standard implies a 
particular theory of republican government or it makes no sense as a 
standard for apportionment. In a nutshell, the felt exigencies of 
justicibility as enunciated in Baker and not in the equal protection 
clause, drove the Court to "one man, one vote". "One man, one vote" 
as a rule for apportionment implies pure-delegate-type representa-
tion and that in turn implies a Guaranty Clause decision. Thus the 
exigencies of justiciability led inexorably to a decision the Court 
still says is non-fµsticiable. If this is correct, then Holmes was in-
deed right: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been ex-
perience.'' 
Besides violating the limitations on power that inhere in the 
interdependence of the attributes of judiciality, independence, and 
coequality, and making for vague, almost non-standard, standards, 
the discretionary political question doctrine has another failing. 
For it is one thing to be able to define the limits of one's own 
power; it is another thing entirely to determine that one has the 
power but one chooses to refrain from using it because of this or 
that reason which is solely within one's own discretioIL Some theo-
logians define God's power in these terms: "He could do anything 
but He is letting you muck around to test you", or for some other 
reason, perhaps known only to Him. What is suggested here, if a 
little too flatly, is that the Court's exercise of a broad discretion to 
abstain or intervene is the attribution to itself of a far greater 
power than the power to determine its own jurisdiction. And this 
cannot help but teach, as it apparently did in Lance v. Board of 
Education, very subtly to be sure, a sort of judicial omniscience and 
omnipotence, a sort of "we-will-answer-your-prayer-if-only-you-pray-
ferven tly-enough" attitude. The only difficulty with this is that 
courts have neither of these two godlike attributes and that this 
type of "prayer" stultifies needed self-help through democratic 
persuasion. 
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For example, the problem of air and water pollution fairly 
shouts for solution. Yet many of the leaders, the potential persua~ 
ders and political consensus-makers, talk about finding a constitu, 
tional right to clean air and water, probably somewhere in the 
etheral confines of the ninth amendment. "If we only pray long and. 
ardently, sincerely and plaintively, the Court will sooner or later 
answer our prayer". What remedy the Court could fashion, what 
standard it could invoke, seems to be beside the point. After all, in 
Baker the Court cavalierly announced: "Beyond noting that we 
have no cause at this stage to doubt that the District Court will be 
able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found; 
it is improper now to· consider what remedy would be most ap-
propriate if appellants prevail at the trial.""'" Quite frankly, to add 
a personal note, the doomsday ecologists''" have frightened me. 
Pollution should be the burning issue of our day.• One that should 
easily arouse that "popular conscience that sears the conscience ~f 
the people's representatives.'" .. By looking to the courts for federal 
judicial solution, the reformers not only waste breath in the wrong 
forum, but tend to frame the issues in absolutist terms - the rhetoric 
of "constitutional rights." Such rhetoric, tending to the dogmatic, 
puts off the as yet unpersuaded and impedes the formation of a 
politically workable consensus. The sweet voice of reason is requir· 
ed to form political majorities, passionately voiced reason perhaps, 
but altogether in a spirit of modernation, of listening as well as 
talking, urgent but patient.' .. Exposing and illucidating the pro-
blem in terms of quantity and the 'people's interest, exploring the 
costs of solution, and balancing the two, that is what must be 
done. And until that is done no court will have the tools to solve 
, .. Baker v. Oairr, 369 U.S. 186, 195 {1962). 
""See e.g., PAUL EHRLICH, Eco-GATA5Ill.OPME (1969). " No pun intended. 
100 Baker v. Carr, 369, U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (dissenting opinion of Frank· 
furter J.). 
"""It would be immoderate of me not to add that much of the anti-pollu· 
tion rhetoric is informed by the "spirit of moderation". For example the very 
popular book The Populatioo Bomb l>y Dr. Paul Ehrlich is full of "passionately 
voiced reason", "urgent but patient." B.ut, it is worthy of note that Dr. Ehrli.ch, 
in a chapter called "What can you do", lists 15 "inalieruihle rights" to answer ,, 
someone who says he has "an 'inalienable right' to have as ma.ny children as one 
wants." Dr. Ehrlich includes "the right to eat meat" and "the right to silence" 
in his tongue-in-cheek list, which he feels one must make "as long as the invention 
,of inalienable rights is in vogue." (p. 187) Dr. Ehrlich'& little joke is that the 
best way to answer nonsense is by counter nonsense or "a silly argument deserves 
a silly rebuttal." But the publisher, whose .business it is to sell books, and who 
therefore is expert a,t measuring and knowing the "in" vogue, took the list of 
rights, culled out the obviously facetious, a:nd printed it on the back of the paper-
back publication as M«nkind's Inalienable Rights. 
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the problem, nor ought to attempt to exercise its otherwise feeble 
powers. 
To return to Baker v. Carr, a narrow rule could have been 
fashioned to solve the genuine palitical impasse that the Court saw 
through the narrow lens of the case at bar. Moreover, such rule 
follows from a strict reading of the then obtaining political question 
ooctrine and is principled, i.e. it is reasonable, neutral, and can be 
consistently applied. That rule is: 
If a suitor claiming the denial of equal protection of the 
laws under a federal jurisdictional statute [here 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 or § 1988 J is a member of an identifiable class of citi-
zens who are denied equal treatment, and such denial is bas-
ed on no identifiable state policy but is in fact in defiance of 
identifiable state policy and rests on inertia or engrained 
abuse of political power, then even if the inequality of 
treatment is a political question (and thus perforce not a 
judicial question) it becomes a judicial question if and 
only if the inertia or engrained abuse of power are con-
vincingly demonstrated both by history and the intrinsic 
nature of the problem to be not amenable to political solu-
tion; and it is a judicial question only to the extent that it 
is not so amenable and remains one only until such politi-
cal problem is made amenable to political solution. 
Such a predication of jurisdiction follows from a premise that 
there is a constitutional right here, a right from the equal protection 
clause to a reasonable classification and a second premise, the pre-
mise of necessity, a premise that is consistent with coequality. It is 
that constitutional rights must have some governmental remedy. 
Then if the governmental remedy is ordinarily and properly for the 
"political" government because it involves a political question and 
if the political remedy for the political question is, as a practical 
matter (as defined in the rule), unavailable, then it is meet for 
judicial remedy and thus becomes a judicial question, but only to 
restore the political remedy and only to the extent that a judicial 
remedy c_an do this. This still allows a political solution to the 
basic political question concerning the constitutional righ[. In 
Baker, the basic political question was: which of a myriad of possible 
"reasonable" apportionment plans based on various definitions of 
"republica)'l government" (which definitions are admittedly politi-
cal) was to be the basis of the apportionment plan under attack? 
Under the rule I suggest, the Court could order only that either the 
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state adhere to its own policy, long ignored, or develop some plan 
that has an appearance other than randomness. 
Had the Court done this, it could have broken the political 
logjam but still allowed the ordinary political processes to solve the 
problem of which particular apportionment plan was most in accord 
with the polity's idea of a just government. Thus it would not have 
set an example reinforcing the pattern of judicial self-apotheosis: 
the seeming omnicompetence which in the long run is, as Frank-
furter said, but "sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to be 
disappointing to the hope."' .. 
(3) The. "neutral principle" limitation. 
A court of law, by definition, has no force or will of its own, 
but only judgment. It follows, of course, that a court in exercising 
its judsdiction to resolve controve:rsies cannot make the law to 
cover the case, except, as Holmes suggested, interstitially. It interprets 
the law given by the lawmaker. In the constitutional context, the 
lawmaker is the people and the law made is the written constitution. 
In common law countries, where much of the private law (at least 
until recently) is unwritten, the function of a court as law inter-
preter and not lawmaker is often blurred and sometimes confused. 
For, as legal realists are wont to point out, when one has to dis-
cover the law without the aid of any writing, one appears to be left 
much more at large to declare as rules norms emanating from one's 
personal notion of justice, and that, of course, is what lawmakers 
do, i.e., enact as laws that which the collective will (assuming demo-
cracy) asserts is the collective will's notion of justice. Perhaps the 
· realization that a judge is left too much at large with his own pre-
dilections where there is no written law has created the unique 
respect of common law courts for stare decisis. At least old decisions 
are written. In civil law countries the problem of separating the 
functions of legislators and judges has been obviated to a large ex-
tent by elaborately written codes. Likewise, in interpreting a writ-
ten constitution, this distinction between interpreting and making 
law ought to be fairly obvious and therefore faithfully kept. It was 
on the faith that it could be kept that the Court was made coequal 
and independent, for it had no "Will but only judgment." 
But in a common law country with a written constitution two 
factors work counter to seeing this distinction. One is the common 
, .. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, at 270 (1962). 
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law judicial tradition, mentioned above. The other is that a written 
constitution is not an elaborate code but a set of fairly general 
precepts. As Marshall said, it is a writing "intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs.""" "We must never forget," Marshall seminally 
intoned in the same opinion, "it is a constitution we are expound-
ing.""" Thus the interstices are great. Nonetheless the Constitution is 
written law and interpretation of the Constitution must come from 
interpretation of the written word. Professor Freund, in the best 
defense that can be made of Justice Black's absolutist dogma, refers 
to Black's insistence on giving the written word its "natural mean-
ing" ..... "Natural meaning" is a better phrase than "plain meaning" 
f.or characterizing the process of interpreting the general words of the 
Constitution. "Plain meaning'' has something of old-fashioned pla-
tonic idealism about it, suggesting, perhaps, that there is a perfect 
form, say, of "freedom of speech", independent of the context or 
particular use of the phrase. This rankles those schooled in more 
modem philosophy or in modem psychology. "Natural meaning", 
on the other hand, implies the common sense understanding of the 
words, what to the vast number of people is the "natural" usage of 
the words. It suggests the idea that any interpretation of written 
words must seem to the ordinarily intelligent person to be natural, 
not forced or, to put it figuratively, the interpretation must appear 
to come as if "spontaneously" from the written word.1'0 
Thus, possessing only "judgment" and no "will" of its own, 
a court of law as a predicate of its grant of power, is limited to the 
"natural meaning'-' of the words in the Constitution. Yet, something 
more is implied in the idea that the Supreme Court is a court of 
law. The quality of a court's intersticial particularization of a vague 
precept must have about it the distinct flavor of law, as opposed to 
fiat. As Professor Wechsler summed up his famous lecture on 
"neutral principles": 
. In [ exercising the power to review the action of the 
other branches in the light of constitutional provisions] ... 
they are bound to function otherwise than as a naked 
,., McCollough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Whea.t.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis 
in original) . 
""'Id. at 407 (emphasis in original). 
"'"Freund; Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
467, 468-469 (1967). 
" 0 See teir.t accompanying footnotes !'14-40, supra. 
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power organ; they participate as courts of law. This calls for 
facing how determinations of this kind can be asserted to 
have any legal quality. The answer, I suggest, inheres pri-
marily in that they are - or are obliged to be - entirely 
principled. A principled decision, in the sense I have in 
mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the 
issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their 
neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. 
When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for 
overturning value choices of the other branches of govern-
ment,· or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive. 
Otherwise, as Holmes said in his first opinion for the Court, 
"a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively funda-
mental rules of right, as generally understood by all Eng-
lish-speaking communities, would become the partisan 
of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions ... ""' 
No doubt this is itself a laudable, even a necessary, principle for 
a court of law to follow in announcing the rule for the case. If a 
court's decision is to appear to flow from law and not from idiosyn-
cratic notions of justice that fit a specific case alone, then it must 
make "an intellectually coherent statement of the reason for a result 
which in like cases will produce a like result, whether or not it is 
immediately agreeable or expedient."'"' 
However, this principle is much easier to state than to apply. 
Professor Bickel, in explicating Professor Wechsler, cites Shelton v. 
Tucker"' as an example of the Court's failure to follow the rule of 
the neutral principle.''" At the same time he criticizes Mr. Wechsler's 
citing of the school desegration cases as such an example."" How-
ever, I think Professor Bickel is wrong about Shelton. On careful 
reading of Shelton one is struck by two things: (1) It takes no 
imagination to see that an affidavit requiring the disclosure of all 
associational activity within the past five· years by a public school 
teacher hired on a year-to-year basis is violative of the fundamental 
constitutional ideal of freedom of association. (2} Mr. Justice 
Stewart's opinion for the majority is not a model of articulate expli-
cation of the ideal as applied. I would guess the case was too easy 
for Justice Stewart and as a result he too glibly set forth the Court's 
'-"'Wechsler, supra note 14, at 19. 
'"' :Sickel, supra note 3, at 59. 
m 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
"' Bickel, supra note ll. at 51-55. 
~ Id. at 56-58. 
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rationale of decision; In fact, by certain statements, he almost 
creates a noU"rule, i.e., one without intellectual coherence.1J• 
Despite the obvious blemishes in the opinion, one can induce 
from it a principled rule: when a state makes an inquiry of any of its 
public employees, which inquiry will necessarily interfere with the 
right of free association, a right which "lies at the foundation of a 
free society", then the inquiry must be limited to that which can 
reasonably achieve whatever legitimate purpose or purposes the 
state might have for its inquiry. Such a principle has nothing to do 
with Shelton, the particular plaintiff, or the NAACP, the particular 
association that would by the inquiry be interfered with. Now the 
principle in application requires determination of these material 
facts: (I) Will the particular inquiry necessarily interfere with 
free association, and;· (2) What legitimate purposes might the 
state have for such inquiry, and; (3) Were other less restrictive al-
ternatives available that could reasonably achieve such legitimate 
purpose or purposes? The majority concluded that an inquiry which 
seeks disclosure of all organizational associations. within the last five, 
years where some associations m~y perforce be extremely unpopular 
and where the inquiring authority can discharge the public em-
ployee from valuahie employment without notice, charges, or an 
opportunity to explain, then such lawful hut unpopular associations 
will, in any common sense understanding of human nature, 
necessarily inhibit such association."' It also concluded that the legits 
imate pu:rpose a state could have for such inquiry was to ascertain 
whether or not the time taken up by such associations might inter-
fere with the employee's having ample time properly to discharge 
n,;For instance, the opinion states that a state may inquire of some teachers, 
all associations, and of all teachers, some associations; but not of all teachers, 
all associations. But he never explains how one is to discover the "some teachers" 
of whom unlimited inquiry can be made. His explanation that not all teachers 
can have all associations inquired into is premised on the conclusion that 
"many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's 
occpuational competence oc fitness." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487488 
(1960). That premise does not help explain "some teachers, all associations" 
unless one assumes he meant either that (1) !;(J)lle teachers will belong only to 
groups about whkh inquiry is permissible, or (2) after. initial screening some 
teachers will have disclosed matter which would allow a further complete screen-
i~, or (3) the state could pick some teachers at random to make the "all asso-
ciations" inquiry, like the Internal Revenue Service's random audit Policy. (1) 
and (3) run from silly to absurd, so (2) is elected. The problem is that one has 
!o :·~ume" his meaning and without such explanatory assumption the opinion 
1s incoherent. 
'" Id. at 486-4S.7. 
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his employment"" and whether or not the employee had improper 
associations.11" It further concluded that the inquiry was. far 
broader than was necessary reasonably to achieve either of these 
purpo.5es""' - which by implication means that the state could have 
achieved these purposes by asking the number of outside associa-
tions, the time spent with each and whether any were illegal or 
"illegality-teaching." ... = The latter question can be asked either 
by defining various unlawful categories and asking if any organiza-
tion associated with fits the definition, or by listing the taboo 
groups (as the federal goverrunent does) and asking whether the 
employee belongs to any of them. 
This examination of Shelton v. Tucker illustrates two points: 
First, inarticulately written opinions are not necessarily unprin-
cipled decisions. They border on the unprincipled, because the 
opinion itself lacks intellectual coherence. But if a principled reason 
for the decision can be evolved and is fairly implicit in what is 
written, including the cases cited in support thereof, then some 
stumbling, seeming contradictions (or is it counter dictions?) shotild 
be overlooked. I will admit that this explanation is not entirely ·satis-
factory. We expect from courts of law (and think we have a right 
to expect in every instance) clear, logical, generalized rules to ex-. 
plain their holdings. But, of course, this does not obtain and never 
has obtained. Any lawyer who has stumbled through the common 
110 Id. at 487. "[The question] is not whether teachers can be asked how many 
organi:i;ations they belong to. or how much time they spend in organizational 
activity." 
,.,,. Id. at 485 (reference to "right of state to investigate competence and. 
fitness" of teachers because teachers work in a ''sensitive area" and they shape 
"the attitudes of young minds") . "Improper associations" would be those relevant 
to such "fitness" "to shape young minds" and such relevance would be limited 
by the constitutional standards gleaned from such cases as NAACP v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). It would probably include organizations set up 
for illegal pur'1f>oses or that advocate or teach illegal means of accomplishing 
their purposes. Membership itself need not be illegal or the organization unlaw· 
l!ul, since the state, as an employer, has broader discretion as to whom it hires 
to mold its young people's minds than it would as to direct control of speech 
or organizations. Thus organi:iational memooship that would bear a sub· 
stantial nexus to showing the ki.nd of "ideas" a teacher might teach about illegal 
canduct would be relevant. But since the Court in Shelton quotes (at 487) 
Sweez:y v. New Hampshire, supra, that "[tleachei:s and students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate ... " and Wieman v. Updegraff, 
supra, to the same effect, the C.ourt seems to imply that such illegal or illegality• 
teaching organizations would be the only ones about which the state could make 
specific inquiry. 
""'Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479,488 (1960). 
$ See note 119, supra. 
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law precedents in a particular jurisdiction to ascertain the control-
ling principle for his case has almost instinctively used such a rule 
as here outlined for inferring principles from opinions. Not to do 
so would not only make the process of using precedents extremely 
difficult, it would make it absurd. Most judges often fail to be 
logical or clear, and even the best sometimes do - even Homer 
sometimes nods."'' We expect and generally get a better performance 
from the Supreme Court than from our other courts. But even 
with this highest Court, the requirement of principled decisions 
must be mitigated to allow for human fallibility. 
The second point is that if intuition (or some such non-ver-
balized cognition) tells one that the particular result in a case is in 
accord with (say} "liberal" notions of justice, but notions that are 
vague, almost "feelings", and no articulate explanation is made, 
one is inclined to. conclude, as Bickel did with Shelton v. Tucker, 
that the decision is merely the result of the court's desire to get a 
particular just result without the application of a generalized prin-
ciple."" In Shelton, an implicit inference could be attributed to the 
majority. It is that Arkansas's primary motive for requiring the dis-
closure affidavit was to ferret out members of the NAACP in order 
to fire them or at least to discourage, by an implied threa~, member-
ship by teachers in Negro rights organizations. If this had been 
the avowed legislative purpose, or the only conceivable purpose for 
such disclosure, the case would have been easy."• But it was not and 
the Court recognized this. Nonetheless, the Court reached the result 
it would have reached had it been able expressly to find such sole pur-
pose and its articulation of a principled ground £or ihe result was 
muddled. Therefore, one is tempted to conclude that individual 
justice based on the judge's intuition was being dispensed, not 
principled line-drawing. Now if the Court had simply said, "justice 
in this case requires that Mr. Shelton not have to file the affidavit", 
that conclusion would be warranted. Or it would be warranted 
if the Court had said or implied, "despite our holding in such 
and such, and despite our inability to distinguish that case, and des-
pite its being the law, we know what's going on here and will not 
tolerate it." In either event, the Court would have been acting like 
""So Hand said of Holmes to characterize the creation by Holmes of the 
"clear and present danger" test. Hand, Bill of Rights, 59 (Atbeneum ed. 1965). 
""'See the first paragraph of dissent by Harlan J., in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479, 496 (1960). 
'""See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) . 
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persons exercising certain executive functions, such as a prosecutor 
deciding which crimes not to prosecute, or like a legislature passing 
a hill granting special aid to certain people (e.g. war veterans, flood 
victims) or deciding to put a road or park in this place and not 
another: decisions based on no discoverable or articulatable prin. 
ciple but seemingly demanded by vague notions of justice, exigent 
circumstance, political compromise or the like. But such was not 
the case in the Shelton opinion and the temptati_on to the easy 
reading should have been resisted. 
On the other hand, a case that seems to me to violate Mr. 
Wechsler's rule, and was therefore not an authorized answer to the 
constitutional question posed, is the opinion for the Court by Mr. 
Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut."'" I am not here 
quarreling over whether or not the "right of privacy" is a constitu. 
tionaI ideal either in its fundamentalness or in its being attributable 
to the text of the Constitution. Rather my quarrel is with the "rule" 
announced to govern the case and dictate the result. All of the 
opinions""' struggle to find the "right" (i.e. the constitutionally pro-
tected interest) purportedly violated by the Connecticut statute. 
All of them acknowledge that such interest is not absolute. That is, 
the interest can be invaded by state regulation to protect other in-
terests of the public. But the Douglas opinion makes only a cryptic 
finding that the Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute sweeps too 
broadly and thus has a constitutionally impermissible "impact'' on 
the right."" In effect he announced that there is a right at large in 
this land, fundamental, but not absolute, any invasion of which 
must give pause for careful scrutiny but "if you want to predict 
beforehand what the result of our scrutiny will be, better read bio-
graphies of the judges to discover their prepossessions because we 
have no rule for such examination." Had the Court said, as Justice 
Goldberg's opinion comes close to saying, that the state may never 
,.. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
"" There are five opinions in addition to Douglas': supplemental concurring 
opinion by Goldberg joined by Brennan and Warren; separate, "concurring in 
the judgment" opinions by Harlan and White; and reciprocating dissenting opin· 
ions by Black and Stewart. 
==Griswo1d v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Justice Goldberg's 
separate opinion does state that the individual interest can be overbalanced only 
by a "compelling'' state interest and that the law must be "neces.sary" to the 
protection of such interest and "not merely rationally related" to its protection. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). :Sut he concludes with the statement: 
.. Gonnecticut cannot constitutionally abridge this fundamental right [to marital 
privacyJ. . :• This statement would seem to make the right absolute. 
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pass a law interfering with marital privacy,""' a principle would be 
apparent. It does not matter that a principled reason could have 
been given, if in fact none was given or fairly implied.""' To say that 
a law has an impermissible impact on a right is to give no guid-
ance, no rule for legislatures to follow. It is like a prosecutor saying, 
"Well, taking into account all the circumstances here, I am not 
going to prosecute the perpetrator of this particular crime." Such 
decision may give insight into the particular sense of justice of 
the prosecutor, perhaps into hfa "personality", which may help pre-
dict how he feels and will behave in the future, but it yields no 
standard to govern his future behavior. 
Nor does the ''compelling interest doctrine" suggested by the 
Goldberg opinion"• yield a guiding principle; Under this doctrine, 
the purported principle for balancing interests is :that when a liti-
gant's interest is found to be fundamental (i.e., constitutionaUy 
protected) then the state's countervailing int_erest must be com-
pelling. But compelling to whom is the question. The answer ap-
parently is "compelling to us judges." But no guidance is given as 
to what will appear to be compelling to the judges. If the Court 
traces from the roots up the value of the individual's asserted inter-
est, but then fails to demonstrate why the state's interest is not 
compelling, there is no principle-there is only subjective judgment. 
What has happened, I will be so bold as to suggest, is that the 
Court feels the compulsion to pass on the substance of legislative 
action, but has rejected so thoroughly the substantive due process 
doctrine that balanced individual against state interests, that it no 
longer can "talk." in language that might even suggest that "abhor-
""'See note 127, supra. 
""'Justice Douglas does hint at a principle in saying "[s]uch a law cannot 
stand in light of the :familar principle, so often applied by this court, that a 
'governmental purpose to eontrol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to 
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily 
broadly and the...-eby invade the area of protected freedoms.' Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 485 (1965) . Is that a principle? 'lt so, is it more 
than the ''principle" that a state cannot pass u~stitutional laws? Does it also 
say that when a law invades constitutionally protected interests it can do so only 
so far as ( (a) absolutely, (b) reasonably, (c) arguably) necessary to achieve a 
( (a) vital, (b) necessary. (c) laudab1e but not necessary, (d) merely legitimate) 
state purpose? Or does it say simply that the state may not in any way "invade 
the area of protected freedoms," i.!e., may not, no matter how vital the interest. 
interfere with· marital privacy? I am sugges,ting that not only is the quoted 
statement equivocal on its own terros, but that since the opinion does not ev_en 
casually examine the state's interest, it gives no help in tightening the lOOBe 
language. 
""' See not.e 127. supra. 
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rent" doctrine. No one will gainsay the past abuse of that 
doctrine."' Nor is there any argument that much of the abuse came 
from an overly subjective conclusion as to which "liberty" or indivi. 
dual right was sufficient to overtutn the legislative or public inter-, 
est and a too cavalier treatment of the initial legislative balancing."" , 
So a salutory shift in emphasis took place with the advent of the 
Roosevelt majority. The new emphasis on finding an objective, 
fundamentalness of the challenging litigant's interest led some~ 
most acutely Mr. Justice Black, to the Bill of Rights as that objective 
sign of fundamentalness. Since the language of most of the Bill of 
Rights, with the possible exception of the fourth amendment, does, ·· · 
not appear to yield a balancing principle, once the right is located 
therein the state's interest has to give way. "Rights analysis," as 
opposed to balancing, is perfectly acceptable in the area of proce-
dure. If one· has a "right" to a certain prescribed procedure 
before something else can happen to one, then the question is .. 
simply: Did the state do what it was commanded to do?' .. However, 
it is not nearly as acceptable when the substance of the law is being 
challenged, as is evidenced by the great and continuing debate over 
"balancing" in the first amendment area. When substantive law 
is challenged as (say) an abridgment of the freedom of speech, 
then analysis of the words "abridgment" and "freedom of speech'; 
make necessary an examination of the purpose of the law claimed 
to interfere, the nature of the speech interfered with. how much it 
is interfered with, and how it is interfered with. Any conclusion as 
to whether or not there is an "abridgment of freedom of speech" 
requires balancing: privacy, reputation, truth or morality, versus 
pure speech (libel and obscenity cases); order versus pure speech 
(incitement cases), etc."" 
'"' See text accompanying notes 49-50, supra. 
""'See text accompanying notes 51-57, supra. 
, .. Those "duties" are given only in a "thou shalt not" context. They are 
not sole affirmative commands to government, e.g., that the state must provide 
welfare. Rather they are conditional commands, i.e;, if the smte does X, then 
it must do Y. For example, if the state pu1nishes for crimle, then it must give 
notice, hearing, etc. 
"" There are some cases that can be put hypothetically which seem to require 
no balancing. For instance, if Congress should pass a law saying. "in the interest 
of law and order, no one may ma!<e a speech on a college campus that criticizes 
the President's war policy or the war in Vietnam,{' clearly it would abridge 
freedom of speech. No balancing needed-obviously! Now imagine that· Congress 
passes another law; "no one shall make a speech which urges individuals 
to assassinate the President, or which teaches the propriety of killing or of 
blowing up buildings to bring about refonn." Clearly, this is a limitation on 
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Of course there is no nice clean dichotomy between judicial 
review of procedural and substantive law. But it is suggested that in 
general when governmental action is challenged for failure to do 
something, it is sensible to focus on the "right" to have it done, and 
while the process of determing the right requires a kind of bal-
ancing, such balancing does not require an examination of the 
"q~ality" of what the government is doing-that is, of the values ser-
ved by the governmental action or the public interest protected-
but rather with the quantz'ty of the interference with the indivM.-
ual."" Professor Bickel points out that procedural decisions "deal 
with the 'how' of governmental action, whereas substantive decisions 
go to ends, dealing with the what.' """ And in determining the 
"how", the only balancing is as against the "how much" on the 
other side."' The examination of the "what'' of governmental 
action (i.e., the determination of whether or not it can be done at all) 
necessarily involves weighing competing values, examining com-
peting interests. The first amendment helps to identify the individ-
ual's interests, it helps establish a hierarchy of values, but despite 
speech. But is it unconstitutional? Is it an "abridgment'' of "freedom of spc,ech"?J 
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (19.51) (first paragraph of dissent by 
Douglas) . At least, it should give pause, a pause to consciously weigh the inter-
ests involved. I suggest that there was balancing in the rm:st hypothet as· well 
but that it was over in the twinkling of an eye. The balancing was between the 
interest in order ancl the interest in free speech. While the governmental pur-
pose is legitimate, jn the name of order all speech could be suppressed; that is 
the standard excuse m dictatorship!. Therefore, the quantity of disorder that 
will be caused must be weighed against the quantity of the interference with 
spe~. In the first hypothetical case, the quantity of disorder that will be caused 
is obviously problematical, as is the causal link itself. The quantity of the inter-
ference with speech, on the other hanrl, is so large and direct that to state 
its magnitude would require resort to truisms about a free society. The imbalance 
Jiere is so obvious we don't even think about it. 
The current rule for applying the . ideal, .tireedom of speech, r.o concrete 
situations ill the "clear and present danger test." See Bradenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969). That is, of course, a balancing test. In a world in which 
speech is such a powerful guad to action, in which lille, bodily integrity, and 
property are so highly valued, and wheFe men are practical enough to get 
through the day, some such balancing test is simply inevitable. Ill one knows 
that N act. will cause X destruction, and knows that A is about to do N. as an 
ordinary h~man problem-solver, one stops A. If N is "speech" which will came 
X d~truc.t1on,. what is the difference? If the causal Hnk is really certain, only 
monkish 1deal1sm would allow the speech. Ours is a practical nation, which 
presupposes a practical particularization of ideals. (See text below in Section C 
(2).) See, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 117 (1970). 
,.. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). 
""' Bickel, supra note 3, at 233 . 
• ""Com.pare the procedural rights aff.orded an accused charged with a 
cap1tal felony with those afforded in cases of non-capital felony, misdemeanor, 
mmor offense. 
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its absolutist language, it is no simple mechanical rule in anything', 
like the sense of (say) "the right. .. to be confronted with the wit: , 
nesses against him" in any criminal prosecution. 
This balancing is not unlike the examination of a statute fot 
reasonableness under the old .mbstantive due process standard. The, 
judges most committed to throwing out substantive due process alSd; 
refused to "balance away" first amendment rights."' Thus, when 
reviewing state action under the fourteenth amendment, these 
judges will not only not talk. in terms of reasonableness, but will also 
insist on finding a very fundamental human right (hopefully 
from the Bill of Rights) on the individual litigant's side, and if 
it is found, refuse openly to consider countervailing state interest::,,; ·· 
Couple this with the felt need to strike down "uncommonly silly"';. 
state laws, and two things occur which violate the limitation dis, 
cussed here under the rubric "neutral principles": (a) the insis-
tence on finding the individual interest enshrined as an absolute-, 
in other words, as if specifically put in first amendment - like 
language-but without the insistence that the natural meaning of the 
language of the Constitution yield such individual right;' .. and (b) , 
either failure to examine the state's reason for passing the law or· 
dismissal of such interest with a verbal flick of the wrist, incanting 
the phrase, "not compelling." These violations teach an attitude to-
ward "rights," even toward the idea of law, that is inimical to demo,; 
cracy or any free society-an attitude of thinking of all rights in 
terms of uncompromisable absolutes and an attitude that the source 
of rights is no consensus but natural justice."'" 
-see, e.g,, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, (dissenting opinion of 
Black, J.) (1959) • 
""' Griswold. v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J. dissenting, 
characterizing the Connecticut law). 
""'The inability to read a general right of privacy into the "natural mean-
ing" of the Bm of Rights apparently caused Justice Goldberg's desperate 
resort to the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 3S1 U.S. 479, 487-499 
(1965). 
141 Whether or not there is "natural justice" or "natural rights" is a meta-
physical question not relevant here. For assuming there is "natural justice'' 
which can be discovered through reason, the question remains: Discovered 
through whose reason? The answer is that in a democracy it is discovered through 
the reason of the people as manifested in the collective life of the nation. Iri. 
a constitutional democracy such "discoveries" are enshrined in words in a cons 
stitution or basic resolution of government. In an absolute monarchy, the king 
discovers the principles inhering in natural justice through his own reason, 
helped, no doubt, by his advisen;, mnch as the people in a democracy are 
helped by their leaders, including the Supreme Court. Whether or not one be-
lieves in natural justice, there is no way to avoid the question of the human 
source of law. Reason is no Mount Sinai. And unless one is an absolute monarch, 
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In Griswold, where only the "right" is analyzed, the natural 
principle (or at least the commonly imported one) is that the right 
is absolute. For, and this may be crux of the error in unprincipled 
decisions, we tend to import principle into judicial decisions (i.e., 
we tend to think they are principled just because a court made the 
decisions) . The court in Griswold, the inference goes, did not bother 
to articulate how it struck the balance for there could be no real 
balancing away of this absolute. Moreover, and surely this is the 
danger that Justices Black and Stewart were concerned about, the 
interest, the right, the liberty or whathaveyou, is not expressed in 
words the ''natural meaning'' of which yields "right to marital pri-
vacy." This encourages an attitude of seeking, in the name of con-
stitutional rights, judicial vindication of whatever interest seems 
paramount to a concerned individual - clean air, clear water, 
abortion,"" 25¢ subway fare, etc. - without first generating in the 
one cannot sa.y that the natural justice my reason has discovered is the Law 
even if most others whom I respect have reached the same conclusion through 
their reason. Unfortunately, there are many today who act hKe absolute 
monarchs in this respect. The faith of democracy is that if one's "discoveries" 
are "true," then one will be able to convince the people to convert them into 
positive law. Until that happen&, one's discoveries are not proven and are not 
Law. If one does not believe that, he is no democrat. For those who believe in 
"natural rights'' and democracy, the statement to which this is a footnote would 
more accurately read: "an attitude that the source of 1aw is not popular reason 
but rather my reason or the reason of others like me or the reason of the best of 
us, some 'natural aristoo:acy.'" 
_""' The growing practice of using the "right of privacyn to attack and strike 
down abortion laws exemplifes my point. In People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 
458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied 391' U.S. 915- (1970), the California Supreme 
Court in obiter dictum that seemed to reassure the majority in a decision hold-
ing the "old" California anti-abortion law void for vagueness, declared, in effect, 
a constitutional right to abortion, relying mainly on Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 
(D.C.D.Q. 1969) prob. juris. noted - U.S. - (1970) . Then in Ba.bbitz. v. McCavm, 
310 F. Supp. 293 (E. D. Wisc. 1970) , a three-judge district court in: W1Sconsin 
struck down the Wjsconsin anti-abortion law, eirpressly because it violated the 
"right of privacy" of the ninth 3lllendment. What is arresting about these 
decisions is the casual way in whjch the courts assume this new "right to 
:tbortion" and the utterly cavalier treatment given to the countervailing state 
interest. The value promoted by anti-abortion laws is the same as that promoted 
?Y anti-euthanasia interpretations of murder laws-human life. Human life 
1s so sao:ed that no human being has the right ever to take another's life, 
and in the past, abortion was allowed only when the choice was between two 
human lives. Moreover, human life is so sacred that the state will not tolerate 
any human discretion as to when a piece of protoplasm becomes in fact a 
human being: so the limit was. pushed all the way back to conception, the 
moment when the pieces of protoplasm become a ruscrete rell that will become 
a human being. Ah, "become a human being" there's the rub. For how is it to 
1:e determined when the becoming is complete? Is it at conception, three months, 
srx. months, birth, one year, four years, seven years? Many answer.. are possible. 
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political marketplace the national consensus necessary to enshrine: 
the interest in the Constitution through amendment. And thati 
teaches something about basic rights not being consensual, as well 
as sapping the persuasive energy necessary to give important inter~' 
ests consensual protection. If the idea gets too much at large in this, 
country that basic rights, basic law, is not consensual, the spirit ()l{ //' 
compromise and the spirit of persuasion wiII be gone and with the.i:Jt · :}'; 
democracy and free society. · · · :;:l 
It should be noted here that I have no quarrel with Mr. Justi(¢/;':)(i 
Harlan's approach"" to discovering the meaning of "liberty" in th~::\:}I 
due process, clause, for this approach, like Mr. Justice White's motiff\ 
frankly old-fashioned "substantive due process" approach, contain$' l \ 
within it both balancing and a deep commitment to the broadly.,!;} 
consensual ideal."' Harlan did not seek to find another "right" foJ{'" / 
the Bill of Rights panoply-with all that implies in the way of'· 
absolutism; no free-floating right to give false hope to those who\· 
would skip politics. His focus was on whether or not this particula{Y 
Connecticut law violated basic values implicit in a scheme of orderr .. 
ed liberty as to these litigants such that it could be confidently said;' 
. 1:\ 
------------------------------.;··· .. , 
think a pre-three-man.th-old fetus can safely be defined as ''not a human being,'.'\';; 
but I am not sure that it is entirely safe. Might it be a step toward "Brave N¢W:' ' 
World"? I would at least want to be able to repeal the experiment if it failed._:·;;/ 
But to declare the option to abort an unquickened fetus a fundamental right is to' '·. 
preclude such repeal as well as to fly in the face of history. If the Grisumld opin,, : 
ion had. been written in the language of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,. i; 
367 U.S. 497, 522, 539-555 (1961), the doctrine under discussion, which presa~'. ·. 
a new era of officious judicial intenneddling in the efforts of the People to ,\ 
solve their problems, would never have gotten started. Item: Harlan, after ten,,, 
pages of opinion carefully weighing the countervailing interests, declared, "[bhiJ.. , 
conclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactmen.t •.. [;] no natio~: · · 
... has seen fit to effectuate that policy by the means presented here." Id. at" 
554-55.l'i. Concerning abortion laws just the opposite is true. (See Section C, bes 
low.) Daniel Callahan, in ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY (1970), may, 
shed some light on this issue. I have not read the book, but in a review of it ht 
Newsweek (June 8. 1970, p. 65) Kenneth Woodward concludes: "His [Callahan'sJ 
pointed refusal to sound any trumpets is a mark of the finely tuned morii.l 
discrimination that informs this definitive work," 
Poe: 1~ll~~n:p:i°~.;14~;s;';d(IJ!1)~n r::Ch ~e 1:akC:s~inJs~~!:~!e~~,· · : ·;::::;II[ 
of his view of the function of judicial review of state action under the four-: 
teenth amendment. 
""' This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in the 
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and reli-
gion; ... and so on. It is a rational eontinuum which, broadly speaking, 
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imporitions and pur-
poseless restraints .. . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and 
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly care-
ful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment, 
Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
t"·"'····----------------
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that it deprived them of liberty without due process of law.1"" \\That 
is the principle in that? The principle is that no law can be arbit-
rary, lawless, if you will, devoid of reason as it applies to the individ-
ual litigants and others like them."" In short, Harlan was saying that 
this Connecticut law is clearly unreasonable as applied to these liti-
gants. Unreasonableness implies balancing. Balancing necessitates 
weighing competing interests.""' 
Striking the balance in the Griswold case called for a painfully 
careful inquiry such that a decision to strike down this particular 
political act of a co-sovereign was manifestly one that We, the Peo-
ple, in the quiet of our study, knew to be a particularized instance 
of our resolved-to precept to be ruled by law, not caprice. The ideal 
of "the rule of law" symbolized in the words "due process of law" en-
shrined in our resolution comes thrillingly to life through such 
decision and we are reinforced in our resolve. The process of "ideal" 
articulation and teaching remains to be examined in terms of its 
effect on the .options in judicial review. 
C. 
Limits arising as a result of the Sovereignity of We the People. 
That the people have an original right to establish, 
for their future government, such principles, as, in their 
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the 
basis on which the whole American fabric has been erect-
ed. . . . The people made the Constitution and the people 
can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only 
by their will. ... 
The limits on the great power of judicial review adumbrated 
in sections A and B could all be ca:lled formal: its institutional 
""Id. at 545-555. 
"" "Thus the guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna 
Carta's 'per legem terrae' and considered as procedural safeguards 'against 
executive usurpation and tyranny' have in this country 'become bulwarks also 
against arbitrary legislation.'" Id. at 541. 
'" Due process has not been reduced to any formula.. . . • The best 
that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of 
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty 
and the demands of organixed society. . .. The balance of which I speak 
is the balance struck by this Country, having regard to what hjstory 
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as wen as the tradi-
tions from which it broke Id. at 542 . 
... Both statements were made by Chief Justice John Marshall: the first 
in Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch 137, 175-176 (1803); the second in Cohens v. 
Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 389 (1821). 
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limits as a fact finder and remedy giver; as a coequal branch o[ 
government and law interpreter, as a non-political branch above, ,' 
the storm of partisan and factional strife. True, these import limita-
tions on the nature of the substantive law declared and thus on the 
constitutional ideal articulated but that is only incidental to the 
limitation. The limit I now speak of is a direct limitation on the 
substantive constitutional law that can legitimately (and, ultimate-
ly, effectively) be promulgated by the Court. That limitation comes 
from the fact that the People are sovereign in a democracy and that 
the Constitution is ultimately what the People say it is. From this 
flow two closely related substantive limitations on the power of the 
Court to announce controlling constitutional principles. One, the 
principle has to be rooted in broadly shared ideals - ideals, admit-
tedly held at a high level of abstraction but which are nonetheless 
deeply felt. Two, the principle must not violate the "commonsense· 
of humanity." 
Roscoe Pound asserted that it is "appeal to the conscience of 
the citizen, appeal to his reason, [which is] the foundation of the 
authority of the legal order and so of the precepts of a body of law. 
Habits of obedience give way unless they have this support in rea-
son."'"' This is of paramount importance in articulating the funda-
mental law - the People's Resolution. Appeal to the People's con-
science, the Pec:>ple's reason, is appeal to; m.an "in the quiet of his 
study." But is there enough stuff there to actually guide judgment 
to constitutional decisions that are "at once widely acceptable and 
morally elevating . . ."'"" - those decisions that are "an occasion 
for dancing in the street." 
To examine this "stuff" of value and reason, I have artifically 
separated the ideas for analysis into "consensual ideals" and "the 
common sense of humanity." 
(1) Consensual Ideals. 
How does one identify Lliat vague, unarticulated ideal held 
with abiding c.onviction, which being part of "the nation's con-
science," will cause the nation, "on sober second thought," to realize 
that the governmental act struck down was wrong - in short, that 
it was unconstitutionalr Mr. Justice Frankfurter helps us toward 
the answer. "[TJ he inescapable judicial task in giving substantive 
content, legally enforced, to the Due Process Claus,e ... must rest," 
,.. R. POUNJ:>, THE FORMAU\>E ERA OF AMERI~N LA.w, at 28 (1938). 
, .. Bickel, supra note 3, at 243. 
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he said, "on fundamental presuppositions ro-oted in history to 
which widespre·ad acceptance may fairly be attributed.""'' Professor 
Bickel after quoting the above says: 
Fundamental presuppositions are not merely to be 
alluded to ... or even merely intoned, but are to be traced 
and evaluated from the roots up, their validity in changing 
material and other conditions convincingly demonstrated, 
and their application to particular facts carried to the last 
decimal . . . Only through this effort, prescribed by this 
craft, can the conscientious judge himself be assured that 
he is not at sea, buffeted by the wavelets of his personal pre. 
dilections. And only thus can he hope for the ultimate 
assent of those whom otherwise he governs irresponsibily.' .. 
Of course, this process, or something closely akin to it, of find-
ing "fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which wide-
spread acceptance may fairly be attributed," applies as well to deter-
mining the seemingly more precise precepts of the Bill of Rights. 
But Mr. Justice Black objects to all of this. In Adamson v. Cali-
fornia he concluded: 
This process [ of striking down legislative enactments 
which violate the Constitution J, of course, involves inter-
pretation, and since words can have many meanings, inter-
pretation obviously may result in contraction or extension 
of the original purpase of the constitutional provision, 
thereby affecting policy. But to pass upan the constitution-
ality of statutes by looking to the particular standards 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the 
Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because 
of ·application of "natural law" deemed to be above and 
undefined by the Constitution is another. "In the one in-
stance, courts proceeding within dearly marked con-
stitutional boundaries seek to execute palicies written into 
the Constitution; in the other, they roam at will in the 
limjtless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and 
actually select policies, a respansibility which the Constitu-
tion entrusts to the legislative representatives of the 
people"'"" 
Black's indictment includes two interdependent premises which 
should be more closely examined, i.e.; that interpreting the Bill of 
Rights is a diffeTen.t kind of thing than interpreting the "due pro-
'"'- Sweezy v. New Hampshire, !154 U.S. 234, 255, 67 (1957) (emphasis added). 
""'Bickel, supra note 3, at 236-237 (emphasis added) . 
'-"" 332 U.S. 46, 68, 90·91 (1947). 
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cess" or, implicitly, the "equal protection" clause; and that the 
"Palko-Adamson", "Cardozo-Frankfurter" approach to the four-
teenth amendment is the importation of "natural law" deemed to 
be above the Constitution, leaving Judges "to the limitless area of 
their own beliefs." I think it not too presumptuous first to inquire 
why Justice Black might feel impelled to such premises - and then 
to examine their validity. Justice Black came to the Supreme Court 
in the wake of the storm over the "New Deal-vetoing" Court and he 
came directly from the Senate where he had championed much of 
the New Deal legislative program. The judicial veto was exercised 
in the name of due process, a practice begun in the late nineteenth 
century of judicial examination of the substance of a legislative 
enactment to determine if it unreasonably interf6-ed with a right 
subsumed in the word "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment. At 
first the focus was on the "rights" in "liberty" but such rights were 
imported quite casually, without examination of their societal fund-
amentalness. The focus shifted gradually to the reasonableness of 
the legislation, as in the classic formulation of "substantive due pro-
cess" by Chief Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.JI;< 
Roscue Pound, speaking in.1936, said: 
Discredit of natural law in this generation is due chief-
ly to its effects in our constitutional law. In the last of its 
phases it lead to a notion of the Constitution as declaratory 
of natural law and so of an ideal of the common law as in 
its main lines and characteristic doctrines an embodiment 
of universal precepts running back of all constitutions. 
Thus certain common-law doctrines and traditionally 
received ideals of the profession [ such as "freedom of con-
tract" and "fault"] were made into a super-constitution by 
which the social legislation of the last decade of the nine-
teenth. century and of the first third of the present century 
was to be judged:"" . 
This natural law theory of constitutional rights was attacked 
with the weapons of epistemology and psychology from Kant 
through Freud and beyond to Skinner and Watson. In that same 
lecture referred to above, Pou.nd said: 
"A psychological realism is abroad which regards 
reason as affording no more than a cover illusion for pro-
,.. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937): "[Rlegulation which is reasonable in relation to 
its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process." 
"""Pound, supra note 149, at 26-27. 
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cesses judicial and administrative which are fundamentally 
and necessarily unrational.'"00 
Thus Black, anned with the assumptions of the new realism 
(although certainly not an articulator of that philosophy) , attacked 
that which had frustrated his own efforts in the Senate to bring 
about social and economic reform. But Black was also concerned 
with "democratic" and "human" values. He was able to reconcile 
his seeming dilenuna (choice between natural rights and not 
enforcing "preferred liberties" on state action) by fastening on the 
admittedly more code-like Bill of Rights and evolving a theory based 
on historical evidence that the original framets of the fourteenth 
amendment intended through its general provision to make the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the states."" Thus he could have his cake, 
or most of it, and eat it too; for the Bill of Rights ( coupled with the 
fifteenth amendment) on a reasonable intetpretation protect most 
of the "preferred liberties". But his abhorance of the "natural 
rights" theory moved him to see the Bill of Rights as more code-
like in precision (e.g. like the U.C.C. or Bankruptcy Act) than any 
other Supretne Court judge or professional commentator has ever 
seen it. Anyone who has ever struggled to give precise content to 
such phrases as "freedom of speech" or "establishment of religion" 
in order to apply thetn to a particular set of facts realizes they are 
neither yardstick, slide rule, nor pharmaceutical prescription. The 
Bill of Rights mentions no freedom of association ("assembly" is far 
from "association") , yet few have found difficulty in seeing it as 
implicit in the ideal symbolized by "freedom of speech" - including 
Mr. Justice Black. The words "bill of attainder" have historically 
a most precise meaning, yet Mr. Justice Black was willing to have 
them cover a situation which clearly their "plain meaning" did 
not cover.1.SS That there is a "plain meaning" or "precise boundaries" 
in the Bill of Rights which obviates definition, interpretation, or 
judgetnent is pure illusion - benign illusion if the "plain meaning" 
of today comports with one's own ideal; but baleful illusion when 
tom?rrow's judge sees a new "plain meaning". For, as Professor 
Bickel points out, viewing words in a constitution as absolutes both 
stifles needed change with changing conditions and hides the 
lfill Id. at 'l:/. 
l6'r Adamson v. Califorlnia. 332 U.S. 46 92-12.3 (1947) Black J. dissenting-
Appendix . 
• 
1113 See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 3_63 U.S. 603, 621, 622 (1963) and compare 
with discuss.ion of bills of attainder in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
318, 321-24 (1946) (concurring opinion by Frank!mter J.). 
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process of definition that inevitably goes on.""" The former does not 
comport with the viability of constitutions, and the latter etiminates 
the very process judges are most valued for, the articulation of the 
.reasons for the judgment of what is "the law of the case". 
But if the process of discovering the particular application of a 
constitutional ideal, including the ideals of the Bill of Rights, 
requires particularized judgment with no absolute guide to be 
found solely in the written Constitution or its history are we left 
then in the "limitless area of the judges' own beliefs"? Of course, 
the answer that Cardozo and Frankfurter and Pound gave was an 
emphatic "no". The judge must find the answer in as dispassionate 
and objective a search into the nation's culture, its history and tradi-
tions, as is possible, while still recognizing that even at best pre-
possessions color the vision. To turn to Professor Bickel again: 
"The function of the Justices ... is to immerse them-
selves in the tradition of our society of kindred societies 
that have gone before, in history and in the sediment of his-
tory which is law, and, as Judge Hand once suggested, in 
the thought and vision of the philosophers and the poets .. 
The Justices will then be fit to extract fundamental presup-
positions from their deepest selves, but in fact from the 
envolving morality of our tradition ... "100 
And to hold the discovered ideal gingerly, warily; distrustful 
one's own vision, seeking myriad concrete signs that it is that to 
which "widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed" -signs in 
the common law of the states, in their legislation, and so forth. 
One "knows", for example, that the right to confront the witnesses 
against one in a criminal trial participated in the ideal called "due 
process of law", held with deep conviction, because it has deep roots 
in the common law of evidence, j.s uniformly the rule in the states 
and is enshrined in the Bill of Rights.""} The "rtight to travel" ,is 
found nowhere expressly stated in the Constitution, but are not the 
Constitution, our history and traditions pregnant with its implica-
tion? But they nowhere tell us it is absolute. 
On the other hand, is the ideal, freedom of religion, violated 
by a state promulgated prayer for school children which says in 
essence ''In God We Trust?" Assume further that the child is 
"forced" to entone such prayer, not by law, but by the same kind 
""'Bickel, supra note 3, at 96-97. 
,.. Id. at 236. 
""See Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400 (1965). 
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of social pressure that causes a businessman to wear a suit and tie. 
a college student to join a social club, a woman to look her best, 
a little boy to pretend to hate little girls, a judge to be sober. Is 
there anything in our history, culture and traditions that tells one 
that widespread acceptance can fairly be attributed to the idea of 
the outlawing of such a prayer by invoking the "freedom of relig-
ion"? What is there in the culture of "a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being""'" that tells one that the 
People, on sober second thought in the quiet of their study, when 
musing with their conscience, will soon realize that such a prayer, 
so compelled, violates their resolution to freedom of religion? Does 
not such a blind reading of our society not teach the People some-
thing that is very pernicious indeed? That it is not their Constitu-
tion after all? That the Constitution is something alien? That the 
Constitution is what nine judges say it is, nothing more or less? 
That the Constitution does not em.body their fundamental pre-
cepts of the good society? Or does it teach that minority rights are 
sacred no matter what the push of the majority? And is even that 
an entirely benign lesson? I suggest that the Constitution is too 
deeply embedded a symbol of nationhood and of the free people we 
are resolved to be to be shaken much by the prayer cases.'68 Rather the 
Court is the loser, in prestige and in confidence. Its role as teacher 
of the fundamental ideals of democracy and freedom felt to be en-
shrined in the Constitution was severly damaged. 
The prayer cases are only the most glaring example of the 
Court's failing to keep within the legitimate bounds of judicial 
review. Paradoxically the prayer cases fulfill the dire prophecy of 
both those who fear the natural rights reading of the Constitution 
and those who fear the absolutists. 
(2) Tne "Common Sense of Humanity." 
While the framing of ideals focuses on fundamental values, 
their particular application focuses on rationality - what I ·have 
called the common sense of humanity. They are not really separable 
but caii be examined separately. For instance, the framing of ideals 
by the Supreme Court is done in the particularized setting of cases. 
, .. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (opinion for tbe Court per 
Douglas J .) . 
""'Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203. (1963). The prayer which was the subject of Engel v. Vitale read: 
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg 
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country.'' 
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The general framing of the ideal is done by the Constitution itself. 
What the Court adds is the application of that abstract value to real 
life and shows how individuals and society are concretely affected. 
This brings the abstraction to life, makes it breathe. A living, breath-
ing ideal that is felt to participate in the ideal that thrills and, 
thus, thrills anew, thereby· reinforces the conviction and teaches 
the ideal. A good bit of the determination of whether or not the 
particular application will actually have this effect is whether or 
not it appears reasonable. If the ideal is invoked in a setting that 
seems to violate common sense then not only will it not have the 
effect of reinforcing the deeply felt conviction to the ideal, it will 
have the opposite effect. 
For example, in the case of Mapp v. Ohio,' .. the conduct of the 
police, which was the subject of the appeal, was, to say the least, 
enough to shock-the-conscience of most Americans. But instead 
of invoking the ideal of fundamental fairness, fairly implicit in 
due process, the Court invoked the ideal of privacy ~ or as more 
familiarly recognized "a man's home is his castle." There is little 
question that the latter is "a fundamental presupposition, :rooted 
in history, to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed." 
Nor was there much question that _this ideal was not lived up to 
when the police invaded Mrs. Mapp's home. Nonetheless, no one 
thought to brief this point, as the precedents (and I think comillon 
sense) told the attorneys that the Court had no remedy for such 
violation available to it. Nonetheless the Court found a remedy, 
and declared that henceforth evidence gathered, no matter how 
incriminating, by violating the fourth amendment ''right of 
privacy" was to be excluded from any subsequent trial. The reason-
ing was this: the right of privacy is of paramount importance; this 
right is frequently violated by the police; the states have provided 
no effective remedy to redress such wrong or deter its occurence; 
the Court will therefore use the only remedy it has and exclude 
the evidence from trial. This will of course preclude the state from 
having a fair chance of conviction but it will, reasoned the Court, 
have the outweighing salutory effect of detering the police from 
violating the right of privacy of innocent folk who have no effective 
personal remedy. It has this deterrent effect because the police, 
zealous ,to get people actually convicted and not just arrested 
awhile, will not do things to hurt their chances. About half the 
• 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
-....-------------------~ 
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states had a similai· rule based on similar reasoning - as did the 
federal government. Of course, half the states did not have such a 
rule and some prominent jurists have felt it a rather silly remedy for 
an admittedly worrisome problem.""' 
The exclusionary rule, which uses the rules of evidence for an 
end incompatible with their truth.finding function, only makes 
sense, even on its own terms, if it can be demonstrated that it will, 
in fact, deter the invasion of the rights of innocent members of the. 
public by the police. Moreover, it can only be reasonable if such 
deterrence is greater than the loss in effectiveness of the criminal 
law in detering the invasion of the rights of innocent members of 
the public by other members of the public. Striking the balance 
would require a factual investigation entirely beyond the means of 
a court of law. But at least, the Court's premises for its deduction of 
deterrence can be examined. In the first place for a proscriptive 
rule to be effective and fair it must give sufficient guidelines to 
the potential violator that he can know what conduct is expected of 
him. There is certainly no precision inherent in the fourth amend-
ment language (freedom from "unreasonable searches"} and ~ery 
little has been added by judicial gloss.' .. Moreover the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule is predicated on the premise that 
the aim of police work is to obtain convictions of the guilty. 
Ideally, this is the ultimate aim for the police, although for the 
criminal law itself the ultimate aim is to prevent crime and insure 
order. This ultimate aim of the law is often obtained by the police 
in ways short of obtaining a conviction. The local police officer is of. 
ten called a "peace officer" and for good reason. He regularly breaks 
up fights, quells disturbances, and quiets the apprehensions of the 
neighborhood by arresting "suspicious persons" or telling them to 
move on. In short, he is a direct agent of the community for main-
taining order, extrajudicially. Moreover, he sometimes must act 
fast to remove a perceived source of danger, though this perception 
is grounded in inarticulate intuition . i.e. a sixth sense gathered 
from experience and training. If he "knows" there is imminent dan-
ger of crime or a cache of dangerous contraband (e.g. drugs) soon 
to be removed, and also realizes he does not have probable 
,.. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 24-2 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.. 585, cert. denied 270 U.S. 
657 (1926) (opinion by Cardozo J. with the fa1nous "constable blundered" 
l~e); Friendly, supra note 57, at 260·262. 
,.. See Bums, Mapp v. Ohio; An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. R.Ev. 
80 (1969). ; 
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cause (i.e. he will later be unable to articulate the various sensa-
tions that make him "know", so as to make an absent person believe 
he "knew") he will nonetheless usually opt for immediate intrusion 
because his real aim is to keep the peace, here and now, and to 
prevent crime - the ultimate aim of the law anyhow. The loss of a 
later conviction will disappoint him but not dissuade him from 
repeating his conduct. Thus the premise of the Supreme Court in 
Mapp, that the exclusionary rule will remove "the incentive, 
[convictions], to disregard [fourth amendment] rights" is largely 
false. The peace officer's "incentive" is not "convictions", rather it 
is to prevent crime and maintain order. 
The Court's reference to the F .Bl. experience with the exclu-
sionary rule as bland assurance that it will not hamper effective 
law enforcement does not make good sense.'•• The F.B.I. has a 
different character and function from local police. The F.B.I. is an 
elite force, whose training and skill prepare them to deal with 
sophisticated standards in an articulate manner. Moreover, their 
function is almost solely to gain convictions. They are usually 
called in to investigate a particular crime or episode after it is over. 
They walk no beats, patrol no neighborhoods, etc.' .. 
This analysis shows at the least that there should have been 
substantial doubts as to whether or not the exclusionary rule of 
Mapp made good sense, even 9n its own terms. Add to this the 
problematical nature of the "deter police, Joss of deterrence of 
crime" equation,- and the rule, as a nearly immutable, funda-
••• Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961). 
"'"It should _also be noted tba.t applying the rule to federal agents a1so 
makes more sense because they have, and regularly employ, sophisticated methods 
of intrusion, such as electronic eavesdropping devices, which have about them 
the spectre of 1984. This is especially true when thaie· devices are used "official· 
ly" as deliberate policy by high government officers. For example, see United 
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 640 (2nd Cir. 1950) (opinion by Learned Hand 
J.); cf. Omstead v. United States, Zl7 U.S. 438 (1926) (dissenting opinion per. 
Brandeis J.) • 
""IN LAW AND ORDER. R=NS1D!£RED, A S'rAFF·REJ>ORT TO 'IHE NATIONAL CoM· 
MIS!ll'ON ON THE CA.USES AND l'REvENTrON OF VIOLENCE, Oh.ap. 17, "Securing Police 
Compliance with Constitutional Limitations: The F.xclusionary Rule and Other 
Device11," prepared by Dean Paulsen, Professors Whitebread and Bonnie 
(1969) . While strongly in favor of the exclusionary rule, it is admitted therein 
that "Iwlhether the exclusionary rule actually does effectively deter the police 
is a question without a firm answer. No solid research has put the issue to rest." 
But there is one defense of the rule made in the article that is solidly credible: 
"We know that the rise and expansion of the exclusionary rule has been acw.m-
panied by many efforts at police education." This ·report suggests several other 
remedies for police illegality (none of which has been often implemented) and 
suggests further that the best remedy would be a "hybrid of the ombudsman and 
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mental rule, i& likely to offend the public's common sense. Tack on-
to this the different vantage point from which the public views 
crime and enforcement, and, it becomes well· nigh certain that 
the Mapp rule would offend the common sense· of tlie _ great 
majority. For thtoug~ the news media (the public's_ eyes and 
ears} the public sees the crime and its details, and not the details 
of apprehension and arrest. The courts and especially the Supreme 
Court see the record of the trial court with its focus, in this context, 
on apprehension and arrest. I have read eno:ugh records to know 
that the "constable often blunders" and often in a most egregious 
way. Moreover, the process of review culls out the worst examples 
for the Court's close attention. One must take into account too the 
likelihood that the· general public live in private circumstances, in 
the main, much less free from crime than an upper middle· class 
judge. Thus the average citizen feels much more threatened by 
private crime than by official crime. And the latter, even when 
aggravated, is much less violative of his personal integrity (his 
"privacy" if you· will) , than, rape, murder, robbery, burglary, as-
sault. etc. 
In short, to most of the public the "right of privacy" is felt to 
be threatened much more by "criminals" than by peace officers. 
The Court should have preceived this. "[J]udges must have some-
thing of the creative artist in them; they must have antennae regis-
tering feelings and judgment beyond logical, let alone quantitative, 
proo£""'• 
The Court labors from afar, so it can perceive with dispassion 
the intimate workings of society. But it cannot be blind to how its 
view from such a distance can distort its vision of society. It must 
immerse itself in society's perceptions as well as its history. and tradi-
tions in order to plumb the common sense of its humanity. 
And what is the "common sense of humanity" and why is it 
important? There is-no wholly articulate answer. The late Howard 
Lowry said: 
the extttnal review agency." (Pp. 393-3%.) But such programs that promise 
genuine control of polioe illegality have had rough political sledding. I suggest 
that the gross unpopularity of the exclusionary rule bas greatly hurt political 
efforts at reform. The police advertise themselves as victimized and hamstrung 
by "bleeding heart liberals," who imposed the exclusionaary rule on them. 
Since,_ as pointed out, the ex:clusionary rule does not make good sense to the aver-
age man, the police argument is credible, Any other reform is tarred with the 
same brush of softness on crime and thereby doomed to· defeat. - · 
, .. F. Frankfurter quoted in Bickel, supra note 3, at 239. · 
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What makes for living ideas, ideas really adequate for 
life? How can we increase our chance of having them? 
We can do this in many ways - first of all, by relating the 
ideas we do have to the common sense of humanity._ For the 
common sense of humanity, whatever its faults may be, has 
a deep regard for ultimate fact: For that matter, it has a 
deep regard for education. It does not join in the· vicious 
anti-intellectualism of our time. But it does not lightly 
suffer educated fools. It has disdain for posturing and con-
ceit. It does not wish to be taken in. It can be temporarily 
fooled and follow many a vain show, but it has a built-in 
capacity for returning to what is so. It has its own salty test 
for truth. The lanky old fellow in "Abe Martin's" draw-
ings used to remark that when you hear a fellow say that it 
isn't the money but the principle of the thing, "it's the 
money." Some sense of this deep human reservoir informed 
the idealism of Emerson. This is why he preferred the true 
scholar or Man Thinking to the book-worm-the pedant, 
the art-for-art's-sake aesthete, or the professional highbrow, 
whom A. P. Herbert once defined as "the person who looks 
at a sausage and thinks of Picasso." The true scholar, says 
Emerson, "loses no hour which the man lives.'",.. . ' . . 
When common sense man sees a guilty man go free, he seesf \ 
a criminal let loose. He wonders, "What are trials for if not fot:i' C 
seeking truth?" He sees an example for other potential malefactot;t' .> 
that says, "even if you are caught for crime, you may go unchastenetl:f < 
unrehabilitated, unbanished-let loose possibly. to prey on me.'' it/• 
you ask him, "what of the abuses of power, the official violatiqij°'_ / 
of rights of innocent citizens?" He will answer, "punish the violatoiL) 
banish him, and redress the 'wrong to the innocent!" I£ you prote/f i 
that even the guilty were presumed innocent when the violatitld~ ·?: .. 
occurred, he will reply, "Hindsight shows us the presumption w~~, PI 
wrong-though the presuming was not-besides if his right ought t~, /) 
be vindicated, punish the police, not the public." If you protest thii'.t ::/ 
courts have no smaller whip but exclusion with which two pmi.islf :/ 
he will reply, "Then go to someone else." i :) 
Other exclusionary rules fashioned by the Court to serve enqf) 
other than truth-finding are somewhat less violative of comm9ji;_ · 
sense but, on the other hand, seem to vindicate rights less deeplj; · 
imbedded in constitutional ideals. The right not "to be a witne$t 
against himself" was bolstered in Miranda v. Arizona,"" by conjoi~;;e 
" 1 1.owry, supra note 31, a  114-115. · ·,;:, 
"" 384 U.S. 4.36 (1966). See Friendly, supra note 57, at 266, A Postscript-·@.. 
Miranda. · · 
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ing it with the right of privacy and the right to counsel. But these 
cases seemed to strongly reinforce the.example of the Court's setting 
the apparently guilty free in the name of "constitutional rights" -
an example serving, in the public view, more to belittle the name 
"constitutional rights" than to reinforce the ideal from which the 
rights extend. 
But there is a subtler lesson taught by the example of the 
Court's persistence in enshrining as constitutional immutables that 
to which "wide spread acceptance can not fairly be attributed". 
For, "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women", and "[n]o 
constitution ... no court can save it," admonished Leamed Hand.''"' 
The Constitution is, however, the external deposit of the spirit of 
liberty. And by interpretation of that Constitution, that spirit can 
be nourished. And what is that spirit? Learned Hand best epitomized 
it as the "spirit of moderation." "It is the temper which does not 
press· a partisan advantage to its bitter end, which can understand 
and will respect the other side, which feels a unity between all 
citizens ... which recognizes their common fate and their common 
aspiration - in a word, which has faith in the sacredness of the 
individual."'" It is "the spirit which is not too sure that it is 
right."m 
It is not the spirit that makes "non-negotiable demands" no 
matter how righteous the cause is felt to be. It is not the spirit that 
in the name of a righteous cause would bypass the market place of 
deinocratic persuasion and coerce a result in spite of, indeed ab-
solutely not concerned with, the wishes of the majority. And this 
spirit of "immoderation" is abroad today among a small but very 
important segment of our people. 
It is always the temptation of those whose work focuses very 
closely on one person, group or institution to exaggerate their 
subject's importance in causing whatever joys or sorrows they think 
beset the world. But one has to wonder whether the Supreme 
Court's example has not fostered the "spirit of immoderation." 
Providing an ever-expanding forum for the decision of public dis-
putes where the will of the majority is not considered; announcing 
m Hand, "The Spirit of liberty," in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY - PAPERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF LEAJlNED HAND, at 143-144 (1959) . 
"• Hand, "The Contributions of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization", 
supra note 173, at 125. , 
"' Hand, "The Spirit of Liberty"', 5upra note 173, at 144. This was said of 
the "spirit of liberty," but t.o Hand the spirit of liberty and the spirit of 
moderation were one and the same. 
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in terms as absolutes, rights that are still fairly debated in societt§: 
protecting rights in ways that offoncl the common sense of practic~t; 
men-surely these lessons do not encourage a spirit that seeks t6: 
persuade in the democratic arena; or a spirit that holds its trutfoi 
tentatively, willing to listen, to be persuaded, to compromise; Q~r 
a spirit willing to make practical adjustments, halting steps, Wi'llt$\ 
ingly restrained in the pursuit of ideals. . 
Persuasion and compromise are the only absolutes necessary>t\!i: •·•·•·· 
democracy. Willingness to try patiently to persuade others of tho$e · · 
matters we are most convinced of, and holding action in abeyanc~ 
until the "convincing" forms a political majority, that is the spir:fa. · ... ··· 
essential to democracy. The Court has often not acted in that spirii · 
and the Court is our great teacher. · " · 
m. 
CoNCLUSION 
This has been a criticism of the performance by the Supre))li:: . i ; 
Court of its vital role as "teacher to the citizenry." Therefore it haf / 
focused on what I think are shortcomings-and although I thi4\ /• 
they are valid and important shortcomings, they are not the who!~ \. · 
picture. Much of what the Court has done has been within tJ¥; < 
bounds of legitimate judicial review-much has been "at once wid¢l,j i 
acceptable and morally elevating." The ideals of equal treatr:n.e@l < 
for all, of a broad and equal suffrage, of an open forum for all ideal 
have been 'Steadfastly taught. ....• ··· .... · 
But the shortcomings are too glaring to go unnoticed, or foJ' · 
long, uncorrected. These shortcomings. not only teach coun.tet'r 
democratic habits, but the Court by losing prestige is less potent tt( < 
teach constitutional lessons. And they will be largely corrected if } 
our system is essentially healthy, and it is. The change that rrp;iiff ii 
and will occur is not a return to something once held and now Io·t,f< 
The Court has never in its 180 year history stayed very long with}I'I. 
the limits outlined. here to describe its legitimate role. The prestige ·. 
of courts and especially of the Supreme Court in the Americ.in, ·• 
tradition is too strong for the judges to resist the use of their aw1 
parent power for very long. But if the teachings and spirit of thff 
great judges of the recent past-Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone_,;'· 
Hand and Frankfurter-were more closely heeded, a better pett 
spective of the Court's real power would be gained, and the ternpta"'. 
tion to use the seemingly greater power resisted. · · ' 
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A few, more specific, suggestions can be made as to what might 
be done in the near future to bring about this adjustment-some 
of the suggestions are merely predictions of what will be done. Most 
specifically the Court could (1) overrule Mapp v. Ohio;"" (2) 
modify and limit Miranda v. Arizona;m and (3) limit the prayer 
· ,cases."" Mapp v. Ohio was clearly experimental. It was also clearly 
legislative. Thus, like experimental legislation which has failed or 
which later wisdom tells us was misconceived in the first place, it 
should be overruled. Mr. Justice Brandeis' words are especially 
appropriate here: "[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, 
where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, 
this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows 
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, 
recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the 
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."'"" 
Of course, with reference t_o Mapp v. Ohio, special care need be 
ta).<.en to avoid seeming to give the police license to ignore the fourth 
;;i.mendment. Per1?-aps it should be overruled in a case where the 
local authority has adopted other effective means of curbing police 
lawlessness. Dicta in preliminary cases might suggest this possibility 
and· thus have the additional salutory effect of encouraging such 
adoption. Miranda v. Arizona might be similarly limited and 
modified in a case where the palice have adopted some other safe-
guards to the integrity of pre-trial interrogation. An invitation, 
through dictum, to the same end might be made concerning In re 
Gault.''" 
The prayer cases might be limited by taking in a case where 
the prayer is frankly teacher-initiated and then upholding the 
teacher's action. If this had been done in a companion case with 
Engel v. Vitale'-"' one ventures to guess that all the criticism and 
<1,ttendant loss of prestige could have been avoided. Since it was the 
ttmdency to establishmen.tarianism that the Court sought to nip in 
t.he bud in Engel> it is clearly a matter of degree and the line between 
sufficient . and insufficent tendency can be rationally drawn be-
tween school board and teacher initiation. 
""367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
1 " 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
. '"Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, (1962) and Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
""Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 4-06-8 (1932) . See 
also, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-6 (1944). 
100 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
""370 U.S. 421 (Hl62). 
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The suggestion of limiting the prayer cases by a holding on the 
other side suggests a general way in which the Court could improve 
its performance. This is by a sort of "ping-pong" method of drawing 
constitutional lines. Since most of the Court's decisional rhetoric 
goes unconsumed by the general public and is often ambiguous. 
anyway, whereas its holdings are headlined and unequivocal, the .. 2 
best way to limit a holding is with another holding. Thus if the 
constitutional line is figuratively an invisible net, its approximate 
location can be best indicated by holdings bouncing first on one 
side, then on the other, each getting progressively closer to the un-
seen net, to the point, hopefully, that one can actually "see", even 
"feel", the "net". 
Another more general suggestion is the return to frank subs 
stantive due process standards for reviewing the validity of state 
substantive law. Thus, the Court could review "uncommonly 
silly laws" without the dangerous teaching of the Griswold rhetork 
Of course, the lesson of abuse of the due process standard in the 
first third of this century must not be forgotten, and will not be, if the 
limitations inherent in the Court's being "a Court of law" are o~ 
served. (See Section A, supra) . Mr. Justice White's opinions pre-
sage such reform. Moreover, Thayer's rule of the "dear mistake;' 
should become the principle by which "hard cases" are reversed."" 
Finally, the Court should decide most questions as to whether 
or not it will exercise its great power of judicial review in terms of 
jurisdiction, never forgetting that issues of "concreteness" (i.e. 
standing in the "impure" or non-constitutional sense, ripeness, and 
mootness) can give a legitimate reason for temporary avoidance, 
but not for either permanent avoidance or discretionary interven· 
tion. 
• • • • • 
It is hoped that this discussion has not been read as a psalm 
for conservatism, but as a hymn to liberal democracy and to the 
Court's great and continuing role as the principal teacher-guardian 
of its basic precepts. Our Constitution is a great bible of liberty but 
it is no manifesto for change. It must be made relevant for each era, 
but should reflect rather than initiate evolving fundamental ideals. 
Most constitutional issues that directly affect individuals in our 
society ultimately reach the Court because of our tradition of 
channeling the awful power of state coercion through the judiciary. 
"" See Bickel, supra note 3, at 35-46; Friendly, note 57, at 263-265. 
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Thus, the Court is the primary guardian of constitutional ideals for 
the short run. On the other hand, it is the primary teacher of its 
ideals for the long run. In order to remain that great teacher it 
must become the true scholar. Learned Hand surely sensed this, 
though he would deny the primacy of the Court's teacher-rule; his 
·exhortation to the scholar rings true for the Court: 
I am thinking of what the scholar imposes upon him-
self; of those abnegations which are the condition of his 
preserving the serenity in which alone he can work; I am 
thinking· of his aloofness from burning issues, which is 
hard for generous and passionate natures, but without 
which they almost inevitably become advocates, agitators, 
crusaders, and propagandists. 
You may take Martin Luther or Erasmus for your 
model, but you cannot play both roles at once; you may 
not carry a sword beneath a scholar's gown, or lead flaming 
causes from a cloister. . . . I am satisfied . that a scholar 
who tries to combine these parts sells his birthright for a 
mess of pottage; that when the final count is made, it will 
be found that the impairment of his powers far outweights 
any possible contribution to the ~auses he has espoused. If 
he is fit to serve in his calling at all, it is because he has 
learned to serve in no other, for his singleness of mind 
quickly evaporates in the fires of passions, however holy.' .. 
108 Hand, "On Receiving an Honorary Degx,ee," supra note 173, at 105. 
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